USA v. Harry Katzin by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-22-2013 
USA v. Harry Katzin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Harry Katzin" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 3. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/3 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-2548 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                 Appellant 
  
v. 
  
HARRY KATZIN; MICHAEL KATZIN; MARK LOUIS 
KATZIN, SR.  
 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 5:11-cr-00226) 
District Judge: Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter 
______________ 
 
Argued March 19, 2013 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and VAN 
ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
2 
(Opinion Filed: October 22, 2013) 
______________ 
 
Robert A. Zauzmer, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Emily McKillip, Esq. 
Zane D. Memeger, Esq. 
Thomas M. Zaleski, Esq. 
Office of United States Attorney 
615 Chestnut Street Suite 1250 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 Counsel for Appellant The United States of America 
 
 
Thomas A. Dreyer, Esq. [ARGUED] 
6 Dickinson Drive, Building 100 
Chadds Ford, PA 19317-0000 
 Counsel for Appellee Harry Katzin 
 
William A. DeStefano, Esq. 
Stevens & Lee 
1818 Market Street, 29th Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19103-0000 
 Counsel for Appellee Michael Katzin 
 
Rocco C. Cipparone, Jr., Esq. [ARGUED] 
205 Black Horse Pike 
Haddon Heights, NJ 08035-0000 
 Counsel for Appellee Mark Louis Katzin, Sr. 
 
Benjamin E. Wizner, Esq. 
American Civil Liberties Union 
National Security Project 
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor 
3 
New York, NY 10004 
 
Catherine N. Crump, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Nathan Wessler, Esq. 
American Civil Liberties Union 
125 Broad Street, 17th Floor 
New York, NY 10004 
 Counsel for Amicus Appellees the American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation 
 
Witold J. Walczak, Esq. 
Sara J. Rose, Esq. 
American Civil Liberties Union 
313 Atwood Street 
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-0000 
 
Catherine N. Crump, Esq. [ARGUED] 
American Civil Liberties Union 
125 Broad Street, 17th Floor 
New York, NY 10004 
Counsel for Amicus Appellees the American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation of Pennsylvania 
 
 
Catherine N. Crump, Esq. [ARGUED] 
American Civil Liberties Union 
125 Broad Street, 17th Floor 
New York, NY 10004 
 
Hanni M. Fakhoury, Esq. 
Marcia Hoffman, Esq. 
Electronic Frontier Foundation 
815 Eddy Street 
4 
San Francisco, CA 94109 
 Counsel for Amicus Appellees the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation 
 
Peter Goldberger, Esq. 
50 Rittenhouse Place 
Ardmore, PA 19003 
 
Catherine N. Crump, Esq. [ARGUED] 
American Civil Liberties Union 
125 Broad Street, 17th Floor 
New York, NY 10004 
Counsel for Amicus Appellee the National Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal stems from the Government‟s warrantless 
installation of a Global Positioning System device (a “GPS 
device” or “GPS tracker”) to track the movements of 
Appellee Harry Katzin‟s van.  Harry Katzin, along with his 
brothers Mark and Michael (collectively, “Appellees”), 
claims that attaching the GPS device without a warrant 
violated the Fourth Amendment.  The United States 
Government (“Appellant” or “Government”) argues that: (a) a 
warrant is not required to install a GPS device; (b) even if a 
warrant were required, the police were acting in good faith; 
and (c) in any case, Mark and Michael lack standing to 
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contest admissibility of evidence recovered from Harry 
Katzin‟s van. 
 The instant case therefore calls upon us to decide two 
novel issues of Fourth Amendment law:  First, we are asked 
to decide whether the police are required to obtain a warrant 
prior to attaching a GPS device to an individual‟s vehicle for 
purposes of monitoring the vehicle‟s movements (conduct a 
“GPS search”).  If so, we are then asked to consider whether 
the unconstitutionality of a warrantless GPS search may be 
excused for purposes of the exclusionary rule, where the 
police acted before the Supreme Court of the United States 
proclaimed that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle 
constituted a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.  For the 
reasons discussed below, we hold that the police must obtain 
a warrant prior to a GPS search and that the conduct in this 
case cannot be excused on the basis of good faith.  
Furthermore, we hold that all three brothers had standing to 
suppress the evidence recovered from Harry Katzin‟s van.  
We therefore will affirm the District Court‟s decision to 
suppress all fruits of the unconstitutional GPS search. 
I.     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Given that the issues in this matter touch upon several 
forms of electronic tracking devices, we feel it necessary — 
in service of our forthcoming analysis — to embark on a brief 
discussion of the relevant technology before delving into the 
specific circumstances surrounding Appellees. 
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A.     Tracking Technology 
 This case concerns a “slap-on” GPS tracker, so called 
because it magnetically attaches to the exterior of a target 
vehicle, is battery operated, and thereby requires no electronic 
connection to the automobile.  The tracker uses the Global 
Positioning System — a network of satellites originally 
developed by the military — to determine its own location 
with a high degree of specificity and then sends this data to a 
central server.  This check-and-report process repeats every 
few minutes (depending on the tracker), thereby generating a 
highly accurate record of the tracker‟s whereabouts 
throughout its period of operation.  The great benefit of such 
a system — apart from its accuracy — is that anyone with 
access to the central server can analyze or monitor the 
location data remotely.  These aspects make GPS trackers 
particularly appealing in law enforcement contexts, where the 
police can attach a tracker to some vehicle or other asset and 
then remotely monitor its location and movement. 
 GPS technology must be distinguished from the more 
primitive tracking devices of yesteryear such as “beepers.”  
Beepers are nothing more than “radio transmitter[s], usually 
battery operated, which emit[] periodic signals that can be 
picked up by a radio receiver.”  United States v. Knotts, 460 
U.S. 276, 277 (1983).  In contrast to GPS trackers, beepers do 
not independently ascertain their location — they only 
broadcast a signal that the police can then follow via a 
corresponding receiver.  Moreover, beeper signals are range-
limited: if the police move far enough away from the beeper, 
they will be unable to receive the signal that the unit 
broadcasts.  At bottom, then, beepers are mere aids for police 
officers already performing surveillance of a target vehicle.  
Unlike GPS trackers, beepers require that the police expend 
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resources — time and manpower — to physically follow a 
target vehicle. 
B.     The Brothers Katzin 
 A spectre was haunting Delaware, Maryland, and New 
Jersey in 2009 and 2010 — the three states had been hit by a 
wave of pharmacy burglaries, many of which affected Rite 
Aid pharmacies.  The method used in the various crimes was 
largely consistent: in many cases, the alarm systems for the 
pharmacies would be disabled by cutting the external phone 
lines.  The local police approached the FBI for help 
(collectively, “the police”) and the hunt was on. 
 By mid-May 2010, a suspect emerged: a local 
electrician named Harry Katzin.  Not only had he recently 
been caught burglarizing a Rite Aid pharmacy, but he and his 
brothers — Mark and Michael — had criminal histories that 
included arrests for burglary and theft.  Over the course of the 
following months, the joint state and federal investigation 
began receiving reports of seeing Harry Katzin around Rite 
Aid pharmacies throughout the three states.  For example, in 
late October 2010, local police in Pennsylvania encountered 
Harry Katzin crouching beside some bushes outside of a Rite 
Aid after responding to reports of suspicious activity.  The 
police did not arrest him, but discovered the next day that the 
phone lines to the pharmacy had been cut.  The next month, 
Harry Katzin, along with one of his brothers and one other 
individual, was approached by the police as he sat outside of 
a different Rite Aid in his Dodge Caravan.  After Harry 
Katzin consented to a search, the police discovered electrical 
tools, gloves, and ski masks.  Harry Katzin explained that 
these were tools of the electrician‟s trade and the police 
allowed the men to leave.  The telephone lines to this Rite 
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Aid had also been cut.  Soon thereafter, the police obtained 
footage of another recently burglarized Rite Aid showing that 
a vehicle similar to Harry Katzin‟s van had been parked 
outside for a long period of time.  As the pieces began falling 
into place, the police proceeded with their next step: 
electronic tracking.  The police knew that Harry Katzin 
regularly parked his van on a particular street in Philadelphia.  
Thus, in the early hours of a mid-December morning, after 
consulting with the United States Attorney‟s office, but 
without obtaining a warrant, the FBI affixed a “slap-on” GPS 
tracker to the exterior of Harry Katzin‟s van.   
 While the police do not appear to have set a time limit 
for using the GPS tracker, the device yielded the results they 
were after within several days.  According to the tracker, 
Harry Katzin‟s van had left Philadelphia on the evening of 
December 15, 2010, and had traveled to the immediate 
vicinity of a Rite Aid in a neighboring town.  Through use of 
the device, the police could see that the van had been driven 
around the town for several minutes before parking at a 
specific location for over two hours.  That‟s when the FBI 
began to tighten the net.  They alerted local police as to Harry 
Katzin‟s whereabouts, but cautioned them not to approach too 
closely for fear of tipping off either Harry Katzin or any 
individual he may have been traveling with.  When the FBI 
noticed that the van was once again on the move, the call 
came in: the van was to be taken. 
 While state troopers stopped Harry Katzin‟s van on a 
Pennsylvania highway, a squad of local police officers 
investigated the Rite Aid closest to where Harry Katzin‟s van 
had been parked; they found that it had been burglarized and 
relayed this information to the troopers.  Inside the van, 
troopers found Harry at the wheel, with Mark and Michael as 
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passengers.  From outside of the van, the troopers could see 
merchandise and equipment from the burglarized Rite Aid, 
including pill bottles and Rite Aid storage bins.  The police 
impounded the van and arrested the Katzin brothers. 
 All three brothers moved to suppress the evidence 
discovered in the van.  The Government opposed the motions, 
arguing: (a) that a warrant was not required for use of the 
GPS device; (b) that the police had acted in good faith when 
installing the GPS device; and (c) that Mark and Michael 
lacked standing to challenge the GPS search and therefore 
could not move to suppress any of the evidence.  The District 
Court held in favor of the brothers and suppressed all of the 
evidence found in the van.  United States v. Katzin, No. 11-
226, 2012 WL 1646894, *11 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2012).  This 
appeal followed. 
II.     JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction to hear this case 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231; our jurisdiction stems from 18 
U.S.C. § 3731.  In reviewing a district court‟s ruling on a 
motion to suppress, “we review [the] court‟s factual findings 
for clear error, and we exercise de novo review over its 
application of the law to those factual findings.”  United 
States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 660 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 
United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
III.     GPS SEARCHES AND THE WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT 
 The Fourth Amendment mandates that  
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[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Prior to 1967, the Supreme Court of 
the United States interpreted this language generally to mean 
that the Fourth Amendment prevented the police from 
physically intruding upon an individual‟s private property for 
purposes of conducting a search (the physical intrusion 
theory).  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-50 
(2012); see also, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438 (1928) (upholding the warrantless wiretapping of a 
target‟s telephone lines primarily because “[t]here was no 
entry of the houses or offices of the defendants”), overruled 
in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
1
  A 
                                              
1
 We note that, at times, the Supreme Court has referred to 
this theory in the language of “trespass” rather than physical 
intrusion.  Compare Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-50, with Florida 
v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).  As the law 
currently stands, we think the latter term — “physical 
intrusion” — is the more appropriate.  See Jardines, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1420-21 (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Supreme 
Court‟s most recent application of the physical intrusion 
theory and noting that “trespass law provides no support for 
the Court‟s holding today”); Silverman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“[W]e need not pause to consider 
whether or not there was a technical trespass under the local 
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change came in 1967 with the decision in Katz v. United 
States, which involved the warrantless wiretapping of a public 
phone booth.  389 U.S. 347.  In Katz, the Court announced 
that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places,” id. 
at 351, a principle that eventually became embodied in what 
Justice Harlan termed an individual‟s “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” (the privacy theory), id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., 
concurring).  In subsequent years, the privacy theory became 
the driving force behind Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
while the physical intrusion theory lay dormant.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Santillo, 507 F.2d 629, 632 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(noting that “the trespassory concepts [in early Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence] . . . have since been discredited” 
(footnotes omitted) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53)). 
A.     Beepers, GPS Devices, and the Fourth Amendment 
 It was in this context that courts began grappling with 
the constitutionality of using tracking devices.  For purposes 
of our discussion, we begin with the Fifth Circuit‟s 1981 
decision in United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 
1981) (en banc), which considered the warrantless use of a 
beeper for surveillance of a suspected drug manufacturer.  In 
Michael, the court assumed that installation of the beeper on 
the exterior of a van constituted a search before holding that 
the DEA agents‟ conduct was constitutional since they acted 
based on reasonable suspicion.  Id. at 256-59 (holding that 
defendant had “reduced” privacy expectations in the 
                                                                                                     
property law relating to party walls.  Inherent Fourth 
Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of 
ancient niceties of tort or real property law.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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movement of his automobile and that the use of a beeper was 
minimally intrusive).  A pair of dissenting opinions argued 
that, among other things, the DEA agents were required to 
obtain a warrant because they physically intruded upon the 
defendant‟s property (i.e., his car).  See, e.g., id. at 260-70 
(Tate, J., dissenting). 
 Two years later, the Supreme Court took up the beeper 
issue, ultimately holding that concealing a beeper inside of a 
container that was then loaded onto a target‟s vehicle did not 
constitute a search, where the beeper‟s placement was 
accomplished with the container owner‟s consent.  United 
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 279-80, 285 (1983).  In so 
doing, the Supreme Court explained that “[a] person traveling 
in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.”  Id. at 281.  Nonetheless, the Court‟s ruling was not 
unequivocal, with the Majority cautioning that twenty-four 
hour, “dragnet type law enforcement practices” could 
implicate “different constitutional principles.”  Id. at 283-84. 
 The Supreme Court returned to beepers the following 
year when it decided United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 
(1984), which centered on the DEA‟s use of a beeper to 
collect information regarding the whereabouts of objects 
inside a private residence.  In Karo, the DEA had once again 
secreted a beeper inside of a container — also with the 
container owner‟s consent — and ensured that the container 
would be loaded into the target‟s vehicle.  Id. at 708-09.  The 
agents then used the beeper to track the vehicle to various 
locations and determined that the beeper-concealing container 
had been brought inside several residences (something that 
they could not verify with visual surveillance).  Id. at 709-10.  
In holding that use of the beeper was unconstitutional under 
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those circumstances, the Court explained that, unlike in 
Knotts — where information was “voluntarily conveyed to 
anyone who wanted to look” — the information obtained by 
monitoring the beeper while inside a private residence gave 
the DEA information “that could not have been visually 
verified.”  Id. at 715 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In a 
partial dissent, Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Brennan 
and Marshall) argued that placing the beeper inside a 
container, which was then loaded into the target‟s vehicle, 
implicated both a “seizure and a search within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 728 (Stevens, J., dissenting in 
part). 
 After the beeper-centered decisions in Michael, Knotts, 
and Karo, technological advances heralded the advent of a 
new electronic surveillance device: the GPS tracker.  One of 
the first decisions to address the constitutionality of this new 
technology was United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th 
Cir. 1999).  In McIver, the Ninth Circuit rejected defendant‟s 
argument that installing a GPS device (along with a beeper) 
on the “undercarriage of [the defendant‟s automobile]” 
constituted a “seizure of the vehicle.”  Id. at 1127 (“McIver 
did not present any evidence that the placement of the 
magnetized tracking devices deprived him of dominion and 
control of his [vehicle], nor did he demonstrate that the 
presence of these objects caused any damage to the electronic 
components of the vehicle.”).  The court also concluded that, 
because McIver could demonstrate no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the exposed undercarriage of his car, the use of 
the electronic devices did not constitute a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 1126-27. 
 The Seventh Circuit followed suit in 2007, with Judge 
Posner explaining that attaching a GPS device to a target 
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vehicle did not constitute a search because such a device 
merely substitutes for “following a car on a public street,” an 
activity that “is unequivocally not a search within the 
meaning of the [Fourth Amendment].”  United States v. 
Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007).  However, 
echoing the Supreme Court‟s concerns in Knotts, the Seventh 
Circuit warned that it might need to reevaluate its conclusion 
if faced with a case concerning use of GPS technology for 
mass surveillance.  Id. at 998. 
 Three years later, the Ninth Circuit returned to the 
topic of GPS tracking, reaffirming its conclusion that 
attaching a GPS tracker to the undercarriage of a vehicle did 
not constitute a search.  United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 
F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2010).  The appellant filed a 
petition for rehearing en banc, and though the Ninth Circuit 
denied the petition, Chief Judge Kozinski issued a fiery 
dissent from the denial, accusing the Pineda-Moreno majority 
of being “inclined to refuse nothing” to the needs of law 
enforcement.  United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 
1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).  In his 
dissent, the Chief Judge noted that GPS devices “have little in 
common with the primitive devices in Knotts,” in part 
because, unlike GPS devices, beepers “still require[] at least 
one officer — and usually many more — to follow the 
suspect.”  Id. at 1124.  Thus, the dissent noted, while “[y]ou 
can preserve your anonymity from prying eyes, even in 
public, by traveling at night, through heavy traffic, in crowds, 
by using a circuitous route, disguising your appearance, 
passing in and out of buildings and being careful not to be 
followed,” there is “no hiding from the all-seeing network of 
GPS satellites that hover overhead, which never sleep, never 
blink, and never lose attention.”  Id. at 1126. 
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 That same year, the Eighth Circuit became the third of 
our sister courts to say that attaching a GPS device to a target 
car was not a constitutional violation.  United States v. 
Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2010).  While the 
Marquez court based its ruling on standing grounds, it still 
announced — albeit in dicta — that “[w]hen electronic 
monitoring does not invade upon a legitimate expectation of 
privacy, no search has occurred.”  Id. at 609 (“A person 
traveling via automobile on public streets has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one locale to 
another.” (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281)). 
 Later that year, the D.C. Circuit split from our sisters, 
holding that attaching a GPS device to a defendant‟s vehicle 
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment that 
required the police to obtain a warrant.  United States v. 
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  In so doing, the 
court rejected the Knotts-based argument that a driver‟s 
movements are exposed to the public and therefore do not 
constitute information shielded by the Fourth Amendment.  
Id. at 560 (“[W]e hold the whole of a person‟s movements 
over the course of a month is not actually exposed to the 
public because the likelihood a stranger would observe all 
those movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil.”).  At 
the same time, the court in Maynard rejected the applicability 
of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, 
holding that while the exception “permits the police to search 
a car without a warrant if they have reason to believe it 
contains contraband[, it] . . . does not authorize them to install 
a tracking device on a car without the approval of a neutral 
magistrate.”  Id. at 567.  A year later, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, changing the name to United States v. 
Jones.  131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011). 
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 In reviewing the Maynard decision (now called Jones), 
the Supreme Court held that magnetically attaching a GPS 
device to a suspect‟s automobile constituted a search for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.  
Rather than focusing on whether the owner of the vehicle had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy while driving the car over 
public streets, the Court (with Justice Scalia writing for the 
majority) concluded that attaching a GPS device to a target 
car constituted a physical intrusion upon the vehicle owner‟s 
private property.  Id. (“The Government physically occupied 
private property for the purpose of obtaining information.  
We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have 
been considered a „search‟ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when it was adopted.”). 
 Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, but did not 
join the majority‟s opinion.  Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).  
In his opinion — joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Kagan — the appropriate Fourth Amendment analysis was 
the “reasonable expectation of privacy” inquiry under Katz.  
The outcome would be no different if the Court had applied 
Katz, the concurrence argued, because “society‟s expectation 
has been that law enforcement agents and others would not — 
and indeed, in the main, simply could not — secretly monitor 
and catalogue every single movement of an individual‟s car 
for a very long period” of time.  Id. at 964. 
 Justice Sotomayor, who joined the majority, also filed 
a concurrence.  Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  And 
while she agreed with portions of Justice Alito‟s reasoning, 
she nonetheless rebuked the concurring Justices for 
potentially countermanding an “irreducible constitutional 
minimum:  When the Government physically invades 
personal property to gather information, a search occurs.”  Id. 
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at 955.  Moreover, Justice Sotomayor argued that GPS 
devices present law-enforcement agencies with a low-cost, 
low-resource method of tracking citizens.  As such, even 
short-term surveillance constituted an impermissible search 
under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 955-57 (calling, also, for 
potentially reassessing the privacy interests individuals enjoy 
in information disclosed to third parties so as to account for 
the new realities of the digital age). 
 Among the issues that Jones left open, however, was 
whether warrantless use of GPS devices would be 
“reasonable — and thus lawful — under the Fourth 
Amendment [where] officers ha[ve] reasonable suspicion, and 
indeed probable cause” to execute such searches.  Id. at 954 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  The instant 
case squarely presents this very issue for our consideration.
2
  
                                              
2
 At the time of this writing, we are not aware of — nor has 
either party brought to our attention — any decision by one of 
our sister circuits that directly and definitively resolves the 
matter.  As our brethren in the First Circuit noted earlier this 
year: 
Few courts (and no circuits that we know of) have grappled 
with the warrant question so far, largely because the searches 
at issue in recent cases occurred pre-Jones, allowing the 
government to argue, and a number of courts to find, that the 
good-faith exception [to the exclusionary rule] would apply 
even if the searches were unconstitutional. 
United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2013).  As 
we explain at greater length below, we do not believe that the 
good-faith exception applies in this case and consequently 
take on the warrant issue. 
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We therefore turn now to a consideration of the Fourth 
Amendment‟s warrant requirement and the various — albeit 
circumscribed — exceptions thereto. 
B.     The Warrant Requirement and Its Exceptions 
 The Fourth Amendment does not protect individuals 
from all searches, just unreasonable ones.  Indeed, as the 
Supreme Court has noted:  “[T]he ultimate measure of the 
constitutionality of a governmental search is 
„reasonableness.‟”  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646, 652 (1995).  “[W]hether a particular search meets 
the reasonableness standard is judged by balancing its 
intrusion on the individual‟s Fourth Amendment interests 
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”  
Id. at 652-53 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Under this 
“general . . . approach,” courts look to the “totality of the 
circumstances” in performing this balancing test.  United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 More often than not, courts “strike this balance in 
favor of the procedures described by the Warrant Clause of 
the Fourth Amendment.”  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 
489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).  Thus, “[i]t remains a cardinal 
principle that searches conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to 
a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.”  United States v. Harrison, 689 F.3d 301, 306 
(3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This 
protection applies to both “„houses‟ and „effects,‟” barring the 
presence of some “„exceptional circumstances‟” that would 
permit an exception.  See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 
19 
48, 51 (1951) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 
14 (1948)). 
 We therefore begin with the following observation: 
under the physical intrusion theory of the Fourth Amendment, 
the police actions in this case — i.e., physical entry upon and 
occupation of an individual‟s house or effects for purposes of 
ongoing GPS tracking — are highly disconcerting.  In 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), the police, 
acting without a warrant, had surreptitiously driven a “spike 
mic” (a long spike capable of picking up sound) through the 
wall of a neighboring house and into the heating duct of the 
defendant‟s home.  Id. at 506-07.  The Court proclaimed this 
to be “beyond the pale of even those decisions in which a 
closely divided Court has held that eavesdropping 
accomplished by other than electronic means did not amount 
to an invasion of Fourth Amendment rights.”  Id. at 509-10; 
id. at 511-12 (“This Court has never held that a federal officer 
may without warrant and without consent physically entrench 
into a man‟s office or home, there secretly observe or listen, 
and relate at the man‟s subsequent criminal trial what was 
seen or heard.” (emphasis added)).  While the Fourth 
Amendment recognizes a difference between the invasion of 
a “store, dwelling house, or other structure . . . of which a . . . 
warrant readily may be obtained and a search of a ship, motor 
boat, wagon, or automobile . . . where it is not practicable to 
secure a warrant,” that difference, on its own, still mandates 
that a warrantless search of a car be based on probable cause 
— and, even then, only in a highly circumscribed universe of 
cases.  Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
3
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 We address the “automobile exception,” first recognized in 
Carroll, in greater detail below. 
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 We thus have no hesitation in holding that the police 
must obtain a warrant prior to attaching a GPS device on a 
vehicle, thereby undertaking a search that the Supreme Court 
has compared to “a constable‟s concealing himself in the 
target‟s coach in order to track its movements.”  Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. at 950 n.3.  In the following section, therefore, we analyze 
whether any additional considerations weigh in favor of 
finding warrantless GPS searches to be reasonable. 
1.     Valid, Warrantless Searches Based on Less than 
Probable Cause 
 The Government first argues that the warrantless use 
of a GPS device in this case constitutes a reasonable search 
because the police action was based on reasonable suspicion.
4
  
In service of this argument, the Government posits that 
“[s]ince Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court has 
identified various law enforcement actions that qualify as 
Fourth Amendment searches or seizures, but that may 
nevertheless be conducted without a warrant or probable 
cause.”  (Appellant Br. at 23.)  This is true.  The Government 
cites to three general categories of cases that permit 
warrantless searches based on less than probable cause: 
“special needs” cases, decisions addressing circumstances in 
which individuals have lessened privacy interests, and the 
progeny of Terry v. Ohio.  We consider each category in turn 
and find that none apply to the instant matter. 
                                              
4
 We assume, without deciding, that the police had reasonable 
suspicion for purposes of our analysis. 
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a.     The “Special Needs” Cases 
 As the Supreme Court has explained:  “We have 
recognized exceptions to th[e Warrant Clause] when special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the 
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”  
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (collecting cases).  Thus, so long as the “primary 
purpose” is not to “uncover evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing,” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 
42 (2000), courts should “balance the governmental and 
privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and 
probable-cause requirements in the particular context,” 
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.  See also United States v. Ward, 131 
F.3d 335, 342 (3d Cir. 1997).  Such “special needs” cases, 
many of which permit searches without any particularized 
suspicion, constitute a “closely guarded category” of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 
532 U.S. 67, 77 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 In the instant case, the reasoning behind the “special 
needs” doctrine is inapposite.  The Government cannot 
articulate a particularized interest, other than a generalized 
interest in law enforcement.  Indeed, the Government 
contends that if officers are required to obtain a warrant and 
have probable cause prior to executing a GPS search, 
“officers could not use GPS devices to gather information to 
establish probable cause, which is often the most productive 
use of such devices.”  (Appellant Br. at 27 (emphasis added).)  
This statement — which wags the dog rather vigorously — 
runs headlong into Ferguson‟s admonition that, to qualify for 
a “special needs” exception, the primary purpose of a search 
cannot be to “generate evidence for law enforcement 
purposes.”  532 U.S. at 83 (emphasis omitted); Edmond, 531 
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U.S. at 48 (finding that a search did not qualify under the 
“special needs” doctrine where the “primary purpose of the 
[search] is ultimately indistinguishable from the general 
interest in crime control”).5 
b.     Cases of Diminished Privacy Expectations 
 Still, the “special needs” cases are not the only 
decisions to permit warrantless searches based on less than 
probable cause.  The Government also cites a number of cases 
that address situations where the targets of a search enjoyed a 
lower expectation of privacy.
6
  See, e.g., United States v. 
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 The Government contends that requiring a warrant prior to 
GPS searches would “seriously impede the government‟s 
ability to investigate drug trafficking, terrorism, and other 
crimes.”  (Appellant Br. at 27.)  We fail to see how such a 
conclusory assertion suffices to except GPS searches from the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment‟s Warrant Clause.  
Doubtless, we are aware of the dangers posed by terrorism 
and comparably reprehensible criminal activity.  However, 
we would work a great disservice by permitting the word 
“terrorism” (in the absence of any other information or 
circumstance) to act as a skeleton key to the liberties 
guaranteed under the Constitution. 
6
 The seemingly paradoxical exercise of analyzing a search 
based on physical intrusion under the rubric of privacy 
expectations does not escape our notice.  Still, as the Supreme 
Court noted in Jones:  “The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the 
common-law trespassory test.”  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.  
Moreover, we note that even before Katz, the Supreme Court 
was balancing the “need for effective law enforcement 
23 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) (“When an officer has 
reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search 
condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough 
likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion 
on the probationer‟s significantly diminished privacy interests 
is reasonable.”).  We do not think such reasoning is 
applicable to this case. 
 The police executed a GPS search against an 
individual — Harry Katzin — who, at least when the police 
attached the GPS device, enjoyed the full breadth of privacy 
interests owed to him under the Constitution.  That the search 
was executed on a car is, likewise, unpersuasive.  While the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that individuals enjoy a 
lowered expectation of privacy in their cars, United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977), abrogated by California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991), absent circumstances that are 
not present in this case, the police must still have probable 
cause, Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579-80. 
c.     Terry and Its Progeny 
 In no small part, the Government argues that the 
warrantless use of slap-on GPS devices is permissible based 
on reasonable suspicion under the principles of Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1.  In Terry, the Supreme Court held that a police 
officer could “stop” an individual on the street for questioning 
                                                                                                     
against the right of privacy” in considering whether a 
particular situation constituted an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment‟s warrant requirement.  Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14-
15 (considering warrantless searches based on probable 
cause). 
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and then “frisk” him to ascertain whether the individual was 
carrying weapons.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-27.  More 
specifically, the Court held that a warrantless search — the 
stop — was permissible when based on less than probable 
cause if the “police officer observes unusual conduct which 
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience 
that criminal activity may be afoot.”  Id. at 30.  As for the 
search — the frisk — the Court explained that a search was 
permitted when the officer reasonably believed that “the 
person[] with whom he is dealing may be armed and 
presently dangerous . . . and where nothing in the initial 
stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for 
his own or others‟ safety.”  Id.  Such a search, given that it is 
performed without probable cause, “must be limited to that 
which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might 
be used to harm the officer or others nearby, and may 
realistically be characterized as something less than a „full‟ 
search.”  Id. at 26.  The Terry framework has since expanded 
to include situations where, for example, an automobile has 
been stopped.  See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 
(1983); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); United 
States v. Yamba, 506 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 We find Terry and its progeny to be inapposite in this 
situation.  While the frisk in Terry involved a pat-down of an 
individual, that search was limited to a specific instance in 
time (and limited to ascertaining whether the individual was 
armed or otherwise posed a danger to officer safety).  A GPS 
search, in contrast, is an ongoing, vastly broader endeavor.
7
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 The Government argues that “[a] Terry search is the 
paradigmatic example of a law enforcement action, absent 
„special needs‟ . . . , in which the balancing of law 
25 
Cf. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967) (noting that 
“eavesdropping for a two-month period is the equivalent of a 
series of intrusions, searches, and seizures”).  Over the course 
of the GPS tracker‟s operation, the device can “generate[] a 
precise, comprehensive record of a person‟s public 
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”  
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
8
 
                                                                                                     
enforcement interests and privacy rights yields a standard less 
than probable cause.”  (Appellant Br. at 33.)  This is 
incorrect.  While the Court found that the “stop” was 
permissible despite merely serving a “legitimate investigative 
function,” that same rationale did not apply to the “frisk.”  
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-24.  Rather, the Court explicitly noted, 
in evaluating the search of an individual‟s person, that it was 
“now concerned with more than the governmental interest in 
investigating crime.”  Id. at 23 (emphasis added).  
Specifically, the Terry court looked to the “more immediate 
interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself 
that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a 
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against 
him.”  Id.  The police, in attaching a GPS device to a car, are 
not looking for weapons and generally are not attempting to 
safeguard anyone‟s immediate safety — they are attempting 
to investigate crime. 
8
 The Government also seems to suggest that our evaluation 
should turn on how long the GPS unit remained attached to 
Harry Katzin‟s van.  (Appellant Br. at 25.)  It is unclear, 
however, whether such a test would prove workable.  It is not 
apparent whether, pursuant to such a test, the government 
would need to know how long a GPS search would last or 
26 
 Ultimately, we disagree with the Government‟s 
arguments advocating a “reasonable suspicion” standard.  
While the interests the police wished to further in this case are 
certainly important, the same interests arise in every 
investigation where the police have a potential suspect.  We 
are hard pressed to say, therefore, that the police can — 
without warrant or probable cause — embark on a lengthy 
program of remote electronic surveillance that requires almost 
no law enforcement resources and physically intrudes upon 
an ordinary citizen‟s private property.  Consequently, we hold 
that — absent some highly specific circumstances not present 
in this case — the police cannot justify a warrantless GPS 
search with reasonable suspicion alone.
9
 
                                                                                                     
whether they could, upon reaching some threshold duration, 
request a warrant from the courts for further GPS 
surveillance.  We need not definitively resolve this question 
now, however.  In this case, it was only by dint of 
coincidence that the GPS surveillance lasted for a mere 
handful of days. 
9
 In support of its position, the Government points to the 
Eighth Circuit‟s decision in Marquez and the Fifth Circuit‟s 
decision in Michael.  In Marquez, the court suggested that 
“[w]hen electronic monitoring does not invade upon a 
legitimate expectation of privacy, no search has occurred.”  
605 F.3d at 610 (“[W]hen police have reasonable suspicion 
that a particular vehicle is transporting drugs, a warrant is not 
required when, while the vehicle is parked in a public place, 
they install a non-invasive GPS tracking device on it for a 
reasonable period of time.”).  In Michael, the Fifth Circuit 
explained that the “reduced” expectation of privacy with 
respect to the movement of an automobile and the 
27 
                                                                                                     
nonintrusive nature of the procedure permitted DEA agents to 
install a beeper on the defendant‟s car.  645 F.2d at 257-58 
(“The actual installation of the beeper was much less intrusive 
than the typical stop and frisk.  Michael . . . was not detained 
or questioned; he suffered no indignity; nothing from the 
interior of the van was seized or searched; indeed, nothing 
even from the van‟s exterior was removed.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
The Government‟s reliance is misplaced.  Both Michael and 
Marquez were decided prior to Jones, and thus did not have 
the benefit of: (a) the Court‟s reliance on the pre-Katz 
trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment or (b) Justice 
Sotomayor‟s concurrence.  Moreover, both cases are 
inapposite:  In Marquez, the court found that the defendant 
lacked standing to challenge the use of the GPS device and 
therefore never reached the question of whether such use 
constituted an unreasonable search.  605 F.3d at 609.  The 
Eighth Circuit‟s discussion of reasonable suspicion is 
therefore dicta, coming only while the court was musing on 
what would happen “[e]ven if [the defendant] had standing.”  
Id.  In Michael, the Fifth Circuit focused on a beeper — 
which is markedly different from a GPS device — and its 
decision is therefore distinguishable.  645 F.2d 256-59.  
Additionally, both decisions run up against the holding in 
Maynard, where the D.C. Circuit explained that warrantless 
installation of a GPS device by the police was per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  615 F.3d at 566-
67. 
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2.     Valid, Warrantless Searches Based on Probable 
Cause 
 As an alternative, the Government suggests that 
warrantless GPS searches can be constitutional if the police 
have probable cause, pointing principally to a line of cases 
addressing the “automobile exception” to the warrant 
requirement.
10
  We do not agree.
11
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 We note that a warrantless search based on probable cause 
is also reasonable in the presence of certain “exigent 
circumstances” that “make the needs of law enforcement so 
compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”  Kentucky v. King, 
131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Such exigent circumstances include, but are not 
limited to, “hot pursuit of a suspected felon, the possibility 
that evidence may be removed or destroyed, and danger to the 
lives of officers or others.”  United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 
361, 366 (3d Cir. 2006) (“In these limited situations, the need 
for effective law enforcement trumps the right of privacy and 
the requirement of a search warrant, thereby excusing an 
otherwise unconstitutional intrusion.” (footnote omitted)).  In 
this case, we perceive (and the Government points to) no 
exigency that would have justified the police in immediately 
searching Harry Katzin‟s van.  We do not discount, therefore, 
the possibility that under highly specific circumstances — 
such as where life is on the line, say — the police can justify 
undertaking a warrantless GPS search based on probable 
cause. 
11
 Here we also assume, without deciding, that the police had 
probable cause for purposes of our analysis. 
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 Generally speaking, a warrantless search is not 
rendered reasonable merely because probable cause existed 
that would have justified the issuance of a warrant.  See Vale 
v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); see also Johnson, 333 
U.S. at 14 (“Any assumption that evidence sufficient to 
support a magistrate‟s disinterested determination to issue a 
search warrant will justify the officers in making a search 
without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity 
and leave the people‟s homes secure only in the discretion of 
police officers.”).  However, under the “automobile 
exception,” we permit “warrantless searches of any part of a 
vehicle that may conceal evidence . . . where there is probable 
cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a 
crime.”  United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 343 (3d Cir. 
1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (“If probable cause 
justifies the search . . . , it justifies the search of every part of 
the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the 
search.”); United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 100 (3d Cir. 
2002) (holding that warrantless searches of an automobile are 
permitted if “probable cause exists to believe it contains 
contraband” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  That said, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he word 
„automobile‟ is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth 
Amendment fades away and disappears.”  Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971) (discussing the 
automobile exception in the context of exigent 
circumstances).
12
  Indeed, the automobile exception does not 
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 The automobile exception began as part of the “exigent 
circumstances” jurisprudence.  Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 
(noting that the Fourth Amendment made a distinction for 
searches of automobiles since “it is not practicable to secure a 
30 
validate all warrantless automobile searches, but instead is 
“unquestionably [a] specifically established and well 
delineated” exception.  Ross, 456 U.S. at 824 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus, “„[t]he scope of a 
warrantless search of an automobile . . . is defined by the 
object of the search and the places in which there is probable 
cause to believe that it may be found.‟”  Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 
579-80 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 
(1982)). 
 We hold that the automobile exception is inapplicable 
here.  The key distinction in this case is the type of search at 
issue.  While the Supreme Court has stated that the 
automobile exception permits a search that is “no broader and 
no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by 
warrant,” Ross, 456 U.S. at 825, the search is still limited to a 
                                                                                                     
warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the 
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought”).  
Later cases expanded on this rationale, adding further 
justification for why the police need not obtain a search 
warrant for the car.  Most significantly, after the Katz 
decision had given precedential imprimatur to the language of 
“privacy,” the Court explained in United States v. Chadwick, 
that “„[o]ne has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor 
vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom 
serves as one‟s residence or as the repository of personal 
effects.‟”  433 U.S. at 12 (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 
U.S. 583, 590 (1974)).  Finally, the Supreme Court severed 
the connection between the automobile exception and exigent 
circumstances, holding that the exception “has no separate 
exigency requirement” at all.  Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 
465, 466 (1999). 
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discreet moment in time.  For example, the exception permits 
the police to enter upon and search a vehicle to ascertain 
whether it indeed contains the evidence that they suspect is 
inside.  Thus, assuming — as we said we would — that the 
police had probable cause to believe that Harry Katzin‟s van 
contained some form of contraband, they would have been 
justified in entering “any part of [the] vehicle that may 
conceal evidence.”  McGlory, 968 F.2d 343 (emphasis 
added).  Attaching and monitoring a GPS tracker is different:  
It creates a continuous police presence for the purpose of 
discovering evidence that may come into existence and/or be 
placed within the vehicle at some point in the future. 
 It is no argument, then, to say that a GPS search 
presents the type of circumstances that usually trigger the 
automobile exception.  It does not.  While the police are still 
physically intruding into a target vehicle for evidence-
gathering purposes, a GPS search extends the police intrusion 
well past the time it would normally take officers to enter a 
target vehicle and locate, extract, or examine the then-existing 
evidence.
13
  For similar reasons, the case in favor of applying 
the automobile exception fares no better if we look to the 
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 We recognize that the Supreme Court has sanctioned 
warrantless searches under the automobile exception that, for 
example, have occurred some time after the police first 
impounded a vehicle.  See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 469 
U.S. 478, 485-88 (1985).  We think this to be of no moment 
for our purposes.  In cases such as Johns the search at issue 
still occurs at a specific point in time and is specifically 
limited in its scope to “places in which there is probable cause 
to believe that [contraband] may be found.”  Id. at 485-86 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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“ready mobility” of the target vehicle.  Burton, 288 F.3d at 
100 (“[T]he „ready mobility‟ of automobiles permits their 
search based only on probable cause.”); see also Maryland v. 
Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (noting that “the automobile 
does not have a separate exigency requirement,” partly 
because vehicles are “readily mobile”).  Simply put: attaching 
and monitoring a GPS tracker does not serve the purposes 
animating the automobile exception.  As has already been 
said: the automobile exception permits the police to intrude 
into a vehicle to retrieve or examine then-existing evidence.  
A GPS search does not deal with existing evidence, but with 
future evidence that the police suspect could come into being.  
That is a worthy goal, to be sure, but it cannot absolve law 
enforcement personnel of the warrant requirement.  As the 
Government points out, the Supreme Court‟s automobile 
exception decisions are “„based on the practicalities of the 
situations presented.‟”  (Appellant Br. at 40 (quoting Ross, 
456 U.S. at 807 n.9).)  However, the Government seems to 
overlook that the power to create an ongoing, near-invisible 
police presence via a GPS tracker skews the “realistic 
appraisal of the . . . protection that a contrary rule would 
provide” from the “relatively minor” to the decidedly major.  
(Id. (discussing protection for “privacy interests”).) 
 Additionally, we think that the “pervasive regulation 
of vehicles capable of traveling on the public roadways” is of 
no moment for purposes of the instant case.  California v. 
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985).  True, such pervasive 
regulation gave rise to the understanding that an individual is 
“accorded less privacy in [his] automobile[].”  Id.  Indeed, 
this principle animated the Supreme Court‟s statement that 
“[e]ven in cases where an automobile was not immediately 
mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its 
33 
use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the 
vehicular exception.”  Id. at 391.  Nevertheless, we still hold 
that a GPS search is sufficiently different from the type of 
search sanctioned by the automobile exception jurisprudence 
— and that, as a consequence, even the extensive scheme of 
regulation now affecting motorists does not permit the 
government to dispense with asking for permission from a 
neutral magistrate when seeking to physically intrude upon a 
target vehicle for longer than is necessary to locate, remove, 
and/or verify the presence of already-existing evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing.  Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
662-63 (1979) (noting, in the context of Terry stops, that 
“[w]ere the individual subject to unfettered governmental 
intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the security 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously 
circumscribed”).14 
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 The Government also points to New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 
106 (1986), for the proposition that a warrantless, minimally 
intrusive search of a vehicle is permitted where the police 
have probable cause.  (Appellant Br. at 37).  In Class, the 
police had stopped a car for various traffic violations.  After 
the driver exited the vehicle of his own accord, an officer 
approached the vehicle in order to copy the VIN number on 
the dashboard.  Finding his view obscured, the officer reached 
into the car to move some papers and, in the process, 
observed the handle of a gun.  Inevitable results followed.  
Class, 475 U.S. at 107-09.  A brief look at the underlying 
reasoning of Class, however, demonstrates that it is 
inapposite: the Court reasoned that the brief search served 
several important government needs beyond a basic interest 
in law enforcement, including “the governmental interest in 
34 
 Ultimately, in executing a GPS search, the police were 
not attempting to recover or ascertain the presence of 
evidence already present in Harry Katzin‟s vehicle.  If they 
were, the automobile exception would have sanctioned their 
search in so far as it allowed them to enter Harry Katzin‟s van 
and retrieve and/or verify the presence or absence of the 
sought-after evidence.  It would not (and, indeed, did not) 
permit them to leave behind an ever-watchful electronic 
sentinel in order to collect future evidence.  Were we to hold 
otherwise, we would unduly expand the scope of the 
automobile exception well past its “specifically established 
and well delineated” contours, Ross, 456 U.S. at 824, 
permitting the police to intrude indefinitely upon a target 
vehicle based solely on the prospect that it will, in the future, 
contain some contraband or be used during the commission of 
a crime.   
 For these reasons we hold that the warrantless search 
in this case was not justifiable based solely on reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause, was thereby unreasonable, and 
consequently violated the Fourth Amendment. 
IV.     The Exclusionary Rule & the Good Faith Exception 
 Having held that the police were required to obtain a 
warrant prior to executing their GPS search of Harry Katzin‟s 
van, we now consider whether the evidence uncovered as a 
                                                                                                     
highway safety” and a “concern for the officers‟ safety.”  Id. 
at 118.  Here, neither of the interests is directly served.  
Accord Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (holding that Class is 
inapplicable to GPS searches because “attaching [a] device to 
the [car]” may have resulted in a different outcome). 
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result of their unconstitutional actions should be suppressed.  
We hold that it should. 
A.     Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence 
 While the Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[, it] says 
nothing about suppressing evidence obtained in violation of 
this command.”  Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 
2426 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Nevertheless, to “compel respect for the constitutional 
guaranty,” the Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule.  
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).  The rule 
mandates that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment should not be available at trial.  Herring v. 
United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009).  However, “that a 
Fourth Amendment violation occurred . . . does not 
necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.”  Id. at 
140.   
 As the Supreme Court has made plain, “exclusion has 
always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  To that end, the Supreme 
Court has recognized the existence of a “good faith” 
exception to the exclusionary rule in cases where the police 
“act[ed] with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that 
their conduct [was] lawful.”  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 
(internal quotation marks omitted).
15
  More specifically, the 
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 As the Supreme Court noted in Herring, “good faith 
exception” is somewhat of a misnomer.  555 U.S. at 142.  The 
inquiry is not subjective at all, but instead looks to an 
officer‟s “objectively reasonable reliance.”  Id.  Nonetheless, 
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Supreme Court has held this exception to cover situations 
where law enforcement personnel have acted in objectively 
reasonable reliance on some seemingly immutable authority 
or information that justifies their course of action.  See Davis, 
131 S. Ct. 2419 (later-reversed binding appellate precedent); 
Herring, 555 U.S. 135 (undiscovered error in police-
maintained database); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) 
(undiscovered error in court-maintained database); Illinois v. 
Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (subsequently overturned statute); 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (later-invalidated 
warrant). 
 To determine whether a particular situation is covered 
under this good faith exception, the Supreme Court has 
directed courts to consider whether exclusion would serve “to 
deter future Fourth Amendment violations.”  Davis, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2426; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 (“If exclusion of 
evidence obtained pursuant to a subsequently invalidated 
warrant is to have any deterrent effect, . . . it must alter the 
behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the 
policies of their departments.”).  Thus, in analyzing whether 
the good faith exception applies, the Court balances “the 
benefits of the rule‟s deterrent effects against the costs of 
exclusion, which include „letting guilty and possibly 
dangerous defendants go free.‟”  United States v. Tracey, 597 
F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 
141). 
 When considering the benefits gained from deterrence, 
we must necessarily consider the nature and culpability of the 
                                                                                                     
because the Supreme Court (and our own decisions) use the 
terms interchangeably, we do so as well. 
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police conduct at issue.  As the Supreme Court has explained, 
“police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion 
can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such 
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”  
Herring, 555 U.S. at 144; Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429 
(cautioning courts not to discourage “the officer from doing 
his duty” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Thus, “we apply the rule when police conduct is „deliberate, 
reckless, or grossly negligent,‟ or when it will deter „recurring 
or systemic negligence.‟”  Tracey, 597 F.3d at 151 (quoting 
Herring, 555 U.S. at 144).  On the other hand, isolated or 
attenuated acts of negligence do not warrant the rule‟s 
application.  Id. 
 In light of these principles, the Government argues that 
the police conduct at issue in this case does not rise to the 
level of culpability necessary for the exclusionary rule to 
apply and that, as a consequence, the balancing test outlined 
in Herring and Davis militates in favor of applying the good 
faith exception.  In service of its argument, the Government 
urges that the police acted with an objectively reasonable 
good faith belief that their conduct was constitutional because 
“[b]efore Jones, every court of appeals to consider the 
question[, with the exception of one,] had concluded that, in 
light of the Supreme Court‟s decision in [Knotts], police did 
not need to obtain a warrant to install a GPS tracking device 
on the exterior of a vehicle or to use that device to monitor 
the vehicle‟s movements on public roads.”  (Appellant Br. at 
48-49.)  Indeed, the Government posits that this “consensus” 
among our sister circuits, coupled with the “guidance in 
Knotts and Katz,” absolves law enforcement personnel for 
purposes of the exclusionary rule.  (Id. at 50, 55 n.21; Oral 
Argument Tr. at 23.)  We find the Government‟s position 
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unpersuasive and therefore hold that the good faith exception 
does not apply here.   
B.     Reliance on Beeper Cases 
 The Government posits that law enforcement 
personnel acted in good faith because they relied on, among 
other things, the Supreme Court‟s “guidance” from Knotts 
that using an electronic tracking device does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.  (Appellant Br. at 55 n.21.)  Indeed, the 
Government observes that the reasoning from Knotts 
underpins the decision of “every court of appeals to consider” 
GPS tracking (save the D.C. Circuit).  (Id. at 48-49.)  We first 
ask ourselves, therefore, whether the Knotts decision — along 
with its sibling case, Karo — qualifies as binding precedent 
under Davis v. United States, wherein the Supreme Court held 
that the good faith exception covers police officers acting in 
reliance on later-invalidated binding appellate precedent.  131 
S. Ct. 2419.  As the forthcoming discussion demonstrates, we 
find that the explicit holding from Davis is inapposite because 
Knotts and Karo are both distinguishable given (1) the lack of 
a physical intrusion in those cases, (2) the placement by 
police of the beepers inside containers, and (3) the marked 
technological differences between beepers and GPS trackers. 
 In Davis, the police had executed a search of the 
defendant‟s car subsequent to his arrest.  At the time of the 
search, prevailing Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit 
precedent held that the police could lawfully search a 
suspect‟s car incident to his arrest.  See New York v. Belton, 
453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819 
(11th Cir. 1996).  The defendant unsuccessfully challenged 
the search.  While the defendant‟s appeal was pending, the 
Supreme Court limited Belton, effectively restricting the areas 
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of the car that the police were allowed to search after a 
suspect‟s arrest.  See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).  
In deciding Davis, the Supreme Court reasoned that 
“[r]esponsible law-enforcement officers will take care to learn 
what is required of them under Fourth Amendment precedent 
and will conform their conduct to these rules.”  131 S. Ct. at 
2429 (internal quotation marks omitted).  According to the 
Court, the police in Davis merely behaved as “reasonable 
officer[s] would and should act.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Consequently, the Court found that “[t]he 
deterrent effect of exclusion in such a case can only be to 
discourage the officer from do[ing] his duty,” which was not 
“the kind of deterrence the exclusionary rule seeks to foster.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Ultimately, therefore, 
the Court deemed that the police in Davis were covered by 
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and evidence 
recovered pursuant to the search was not suppressed.  Id. 
 Of great significance to the instant case is the fact that 
in Davis the police relied on binding appellate precedent that 
“specifically authorize[d the] particular police practice.”  Id. 
at 2429 (first emphasis added).  Indeed, as Justice Sotomayor 
noted in her concurrence, Davis did not “present the markedly 
different question whether the exclusionary rule applies when 
the law governing the constitutionality of a particular search 
is unsettled.”  Id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).16  By 
                                              
16
 We also note that the Eleventh Circuit‟s opinion in Davis 
was explicit on this point:  “[We refuse] to apply the 
exclusionary rule when the police have reasonably relied on 
clear and well-settled precedent.  We stress, however, that 
our precedent on a given point must be unequivocal before 
we will suspend the exclusionary rule‟s operation.”  United 
40 
its plain terms, therefore, the express holding in Davis is 
inapposite to this case because Knotts and Karo do not 
qualify as appropriate binding appellate precedent:  Neither 
case involved a physical trespass onto the target vehicle; in 
both cases the police placed the beeper inside of a container 
which was then loaded into the target vehicle by the driver 
(all with the container owner‟s permission).  See Karo, 468 
U.S. at 708; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.  Additionally, both Karo 
and Knotts addressed the use of beepers, which — as we have 
already explained — are markedly different from GPS 
trackers.  See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556-57. 
 Davis extends good faith protection only to acts that 
are explicitly sanctioned by clear and well-settled precedent, 
and neither Knotts nor Karo sanction the type of intrusion at 
issue in this case.  Consequently, we hold that law 
enforcement‟s reliance on the beeper cases, standing on its 
own, cannot sufficiently insulates the GPS search in this case 
from the exclusionary rule. 
                                                                                                     
States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also United States v. 
Buford, 632 F.3d 264, 276 n.9 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Like the 
Eleventh Circuit, we also „stress, however, that our precedent 
on a given point must be unequivocal before we will suspend 
the exclusionary rule‟s operation.‟” (quoting Davis, 598 F.3d 
at 1266)); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 n.6 
(10th Cir. 2009) (finding that the good faith exception applied 
because “Tenth Circuit jurisprudence supporting the search 
was settled.  Thus, there was no risk that law enforcement 
officers would engage in the type of complex legal research 
and analysis better left to the judiciary and members of the 
bar”). 
41 
C.     Reliance on Out-of-Circuit GPS Cases 
 We therefore consider the Government‟s contention 
that the good faith exception applies because the police acted 
in objectively reasonable reliance on out-of-circuit precedent 
sanctioning warrantless GPS surveillance.  (Appellant Br. at 
15-16 (“Before [Jones], all but one of the courts of appeals to 
have addressed the issue had approved the warrantless 
installation and monitoring of a GPS device on a vehicle. . . . 
[T]he agents‟ reliance on this body of case law was 
objectively reasonable . . . .”).)  And while the Government 
relies, in no small part, on the reasoning in Davis for support, 
we think that reading Davis so broadly would strain its 
reasoning, to say nothing of its holding.
17
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 We note that the majority in Davis itself suggested that its 
holding is inapplicable to the situation presented in this case.  
While explaining that its ruling will not deter defendants from 
challenging existing Fourth Amendment doctrine, the 
Supreme Court noted: 
This Court reviews criminal convictions from 12 Federal 
Courts of Appeals, 50 state courts of last resort, and the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.  If one or even many 
of these courts uphold a particular type of search or seizure, 
defendants in jurisdictions in which the question remains 
open will still have an undiminished incentive to litigate the 
issue.  This Court can then grant certiorari, and the 
development of Fourth Amendment law will in no way be 
stunted. 
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 The Davis decision hinged on the understanding that 
“[r]esponsible law-enforcement officers will take care to learn 
what is required of them under Fourth Amendment precedent 
and will conform their conduct to these rules.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  At the most basic level, then, the 
applicable body of “Fourth Amendment precedent” to which 
the responsible officer must conform consists of those 
decisions that are binding on the officer‟s jurisdiction.  
Accord Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006) 
(noting that officers are expected to learn and abide by “what 
is required of them” by courts having jurisdiction over them). 
 Thus, as already stated, the Court in Davis recognized 
that the good faith exception applies to situations where the 
police “conducted a search in objectively reasonable reliance 
on binding appellate precedent,” 131 S. Ct. at 2434, because 
“[t]he deterrent effect . . . in such a case can only be to 
discourage the officer from do[ing] his duty,” which was not 
“the kind of deterrence the exclusionary rule seeks to foster,” 
id. at 2429 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The same 
cannot be said where the law is unsettled in a particular 
jurisdiction, even where persuasive authority may exist in the 
form of decisions by other circuit courts. 
 Indeed, extending the rationale from Davis to cover 
reliance on out-of-circuit precedent would turn this principle 
on its head:  Though our first and last word on the matter is 
that warrantless GPS searches are unconstitutional, in effect 
the Government argues that our sister circuits‟ decisions 
                                                                                                     
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2433 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted).  Thus, the Court in Davis recognized that its holding 
was limited to jurisdictions where the law was clearly settled. 
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should control whether the evidence is excluded.  This rule 
would eviscerate the notion that clear and well-settled 
precedent should control and thus contradicts the basic 
principles of stare decisis.  We respect our sister circuits, but 
their decisions cannot dictate our conclusions.  As such, any 
law enforcement officer who acts primarily in reliance on the 
Fourth Amendment proclamations of our sister circuits does 
so at his own peril for purposes of the exclusionary rule. 
 This is particularly true where, as in this case, our 
sister circuits are split on the relevant issue.  The GPS search 
of Harry Katzin‟s van occurred in late 2010.  By that time, 
four of our sister circuits — the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and 
D.C. Circuits — had addressed GPS surveillance.  Of those, 
three circuits had held that GPS surveillance either did not 
constitute a search or, even if it did, that the police did not 
require a warrant.  See McIver, 186 F.3d 1119; Garcia, 474 
F.3d 994; Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212; Marquez, 605 F.3d 
604. 
 At the same time, the D.C. Circuit had held in United 
States v. Maynard (which became Jones on appeal to the 
Supreme Court) that GPS surveillance did constitute a search 
and that the police did require a warrant.  Maynard, 615 F.3d 
544.  At bottom, then, the Government seems to argue that 
reliance on a majority of a minority of our sister circuits is 
sufficient to escape the exclusionary rule.  This cannot be.  
Although we find it commendable that law enforcement 
personnel would take the time to pore over out-of-circuit 
decisions relating to police procedures, it is not their duty for 
purposes of the exclusionary rule to parse and weigh the 
decisions of our sister circuits in an attempt to predict what 
44 
this Court (or even the Supreme Court) would say if faced 
with a similar case.
18
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 The Government urges that our analysis in United States v. 
Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 347 (3d Cir. 2011) (addressing evidence 
obtained in a search pursuant to the Foreign Intelligent 
Surveillance Act (FISA)), supports the proposition that the 
reasoning from Davis is not limited to binding precedent.  
(Appellant Br. at 61-62 (“[The] insistence on binding 
authority does not accord with this Court‟s approach 
following Davis. . . . [Duka] undermines the district court‟s 
position that reliance on non-binding case law . . . is per se 
unreasonable.”).)  This is not correct.  Not only was the good 
faith discussion in Duka based on a different Supreme Court 
decision — Krull, which addressed objectively reasonable 
reliance on a later-invalidated statute — but the entire 
discussion of the good faith exception is dicta.  See Duka, 671 
F.3d at 346 (discussing the “good faith” exception only after 
noting that “[w]e are confident that FISA‟s „significant 
purpose‟ test satisfies the Fourth Amendment”).  Moreover, 
the Government‟s argument seems to hinge on a footnote that 
contains the opinion‟s lone citation to Davis.  In that footnote, 
this Court stated that “[t]he objective reasonableness of the 
officers‟ reliance on the statute in this case is further bolstered 
by the fact that the particular provision at issue has been 
reviewed and declared constitutional by several courts, going 
as far back as 2002.”  Id. at 347 n.12 (collecting cases).  Since 
none of these “several courts” are the Third Circuit, the 
Government argues, Duka demonstrates our willingness to 
apply the rationale from Davis to non-binding authority.  We 
think this makes a mountain out of a molehill: this single 
45 
 Moreover, we cannot burden district courts with the 
type of case-by-case assessment that the Government‟s 
position would require.  Unlike the archetypal situations in 
Leon or Davis, finding that the good faith exception applies in 
this case would, of necessity, require courts ruling on 
suppression motions to discern what amounts to sufficient 
out-of-circuit authority for purposes of an objectively 
reasonable good faith belief.  Thus, district courts would need 
to consider how many circuits had addressed the police 
practice in question, what each one had said, whether the 
statements were mere dicta, and myriad other factors.  Such 
an approach has no limiting principle and defies rational 
application.  Surely police reliance on a single out-of-circuit 
decision could not support good faith, but what about two?  If 
the circuits split two-to-one, that would present yet another 
problem.  And what if our sister courts had all ruled in near-
unanimity on a point, with one stalwart (perhaps, highly 
persuasive) holdout?  Is the presence of good faith to be 
decided with an abacus or does the strength of each court‟s 
argument bear consideration?  Because we foresee that it 
could lead to a sprawling, amorphous, and self-contradicting 
doctrine, we decline to adopt the Government‟s position and 
hold that reliance on out-of-circuit precedent (even where 
there is a so-called “consensus”) cannot, in and of itself, 
support application of the good faith exception.
19
 
                                                                                                     
reference to Davis comes in dicta, in a footnote, as part of a 
“cf.” citation. 
19
 To see just how unwieldy the analysis could be, we need 
look no further than the Government‟s own arguments in this 
case.  At oral argument, the Government attempted to 
minimize the significance of Maynard, suggesting that this 
46 
D.     Exclusion based on Culpability and Deterrence 
 Up to this point we have considered only whether 
reliance by law enforcement personnel on out-of-circuit or 
distinguishable authority, by itself, suffices for purposes of 
the good faith exception.  Per the previous discussion, we 
hold that such reliance is insufficient to support a per se 
finding of good faith.
20
  The Supreme Court in Herring and 
                                                                                                     
single decision had come too late in the process and was, 
ultimately, distinguishable.  Such arguments would be 
disastrously disruptive to lower courts if we were to hold that 
reliance on out-of-circuit authority could, by itself, suffice for 
purposes of the good faith exception.  How up-to-date must 
law enforcement be regarding the state of relevant legal 
principles?  What if a decision were issued but either (a) was 
late in being added to a reporter/electronic database or (b) did 
not get sufficiently wide-spread exposure to bring it to the 
attention of police departments half-way across the country?  
Not only would district courts be forced to tally the 
authorities on either side of an issue like so many chit marks, 
but they would also have to decide whether decisions had 
come too late, or were perhaps too obscure. 
20
 We note that some of our sister circuits have ruled 
otherwise, holding that, per Davis, pre-Jones warrantless GPS 
searches qualify for protection under the good faith exception.  
See United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828 (5th Cir. 2013); United 
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2012).  
These cases, however, do not deter us from our conclusion. 
To begin with, all three courts relied on binding precedent 
within their own circuits.  The Ninth Circuit noted that the 
47 
                                                                                                     
police could rely on, among other things, McIver for the 
proposition that “placing an electronic tracking device on the 
undercarriage of a car was neither a search nor a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment.”  Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d at 
1090.  The Fifth Circuit, which devoted a single paragraph to 
the discussion, based its conclusion on the presence of 
Michael, and its holding that “„reasonable suspicion is 
adequate to support warrantless beeper installation‟ on a 
suspect‟s vehicle parked in a public space.”  Andres, 703 F.3d 
at 835 (quoting Michael, 645 F.2d at 257).  Finally, the First 
Circuit based its decision to apply the good faith exception on 
the presence of “clear and apposite” authority, including a 
First Circuit decision that found “„the lessened expectancy of 
privacy associated with motor vehicles justifies the use of 
beepers without a warrant to track vehicles . . . only if the 
officers have probable cause at the time.‟”  Sparks, 711 F.3d 
at 65 (quoting United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112-13 
(1st Cir. 1977)).  At the same time, however, the First Circuit 
was far from certain that out-of-circuit precedent could 
support a finding of good faith, noting that “the two appellate 
courts to consider the question since Davis have read Davis to 
require reliance on the case law of the jurisdiction.”  Id. at 63-
64 & 63 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Moreover, both the First and Fifth Circuits based their good 
faith exception determinations on cases dealing with beepers, 
with the First Circuit in Sparks going so far as to hold that 
Knotts was sufficiently “clear and apposite” so as to support a 
finding of good faith.  Sparks, 711 F.3d at 65.  As our 
foregoing discussion suggests: we disagree with this position.  
The difference between beepers and GPS trackers is one of 
kind, not degree.  Any time technology shifts in this way, 
48 
Davis, however, recognized that the good faith exception 
inquiry requires more.  That is, in determining whether law 
enforcement personnel acted “with an objectively „reasonable 
good-faith belief‟ that their conduct [was] lawful,” we must 
consider whether the totality of circumstances is greater than 
the sum of its attendant parts.  See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 
(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 909).  We therefore undertake the 
balancing test outlined in Herring and Davis, and ask whether 
— in light of all the circumstances — the police activity in 
this case rises to the level of a “deliberate, reckless, or grossly 
negligent” violation of the Fourth Amendment.  See Herring, 
555 U.S. at 144; Tracey, 597 F.3d at 151.  We hold that it 
does. 
 Per the Government‟s argument, the legal landscape in 
this case predominantly consisted of the out-of-circuit GPS 
cases, the Supreme Court‟s beeper decisions, and the 
overarching privacy expectation framework for Fourth 
Amendment analysis adopted in Katz and deemed to be the 
sole rubric for analysis until Jones.
21
  (See, e.g., Appellant Br. 
                                                                                                     
courts should expect that law enforcement will tread lightly 
and will refrain from reasoning by (potentially ill-fitting) 
analogy.  Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35-36 
(2001) (discussing the Court‟s reticence to “leave the 
homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology”). 
21
 Our dissenting colleague points to a number of other 
decisions and Fourth Amendment doctrines which add further 
sauce to the Government‟s good faith goose.  (See Dissent at 
20-29 (discussing, for example, privacy considerations in the 
exterior of an automobile).)  While we do not disagree that 
these too were part of the relevant legal landscape at the time 
the police executed their search, we nevertheless hold that — 
49 
at 44, 50, 55 n.21; Oral Argument Tr. at 23.)  Taken together, 
the Government contends, these sources of legal authority 
would lead a reasonable law enforcement officer to conclude 
that he was acting within the confines of the constitution 
when attaching a GPS tracker to the undercarriage of Harry 
Katzin‟s van.  We find that, on balance, this collection of 
authority does not warrant applying the good faith exception.  
Try as we might to allay our concerns, we remain supremely 
discomfited by the lack of binding appellate guidance 
underlying the police action at issue in this case.  Therefore, 
we hold that the police acted with sufficient constitutional 
culpability to require exclusion and, more importantly, that 
suppression in this case would help deter future Fourth 
Amendment violations. 
 Law enforcement personnel can rightly rely on a 
number of sources for Fourth Amendment guidance — 
including on-point decisions by the Supreme Court and this 
Circuit, warrants, and statutes.  We, both as a Court and as a 
society, expect that law enforcement officers will consult 
                                                                                                     
in light of our forthcoming discussion — such authority gets 
further and further afield of the relevant police conduct and 
could only supply marginal support to justify the police 
action. 
 The only possible exception is the advisory 
commentary on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.  
(Dissent at 32.)  However, for the reasons articulated below, 
see infra note 24, we find that this commentary would not 
help the Government‟s position — even assuming the 
Government had seen fit to cite (let alone mention) the 
language in its briefs or at oral argument. 
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these sources — it is a part of how we expect reasonable 
officers to act.  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429.  Deterring such 
activity, therefore, would not serve the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule.  Id.  This case, as we have just mentioned, 
is different.  Nothing in a law enforcement officer‟s duties 
forces him to either rely on non-binding precedent or to 
conduct the Fourth Amendment calculus himself by 
extrapolating from, or analogizing to, existing case law.  
Where an officer decides to take the Fourth Amendment 
inquiry into his own hands, rather than to seek a warrant from 
a neutral magistrate — particularly where the law is as far 
from settled as it was in this case — he acts in a 
constitutionally reckless fashion. 
 Here, law enforcement personnel made a deliberate 
decision to forego securing a warrant before attaching a GPS 
device directly to a target vehicle in the absence of binding 
Fourth Amendment precedent authorizing such a practice.  
Indeed, the police embarked on a long-term surveillance 
project using technology that allowed them to monitor a 
target vehicle‟s movements using only a laptop, all before 
either this Circuit or the Supreme Court had spoken on the 
constitutional propriety of such an endeavor.  (That the 
surveillance lasted only a few days is mere coincidence.
22
)  
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 We therefore reject the Government‟s attempts to 
distinguish Maynard.  While it is true that the surveillance in 
Maynard lasted for nearly a month as compared to the several 
days in this case, it remains equally true that when the police 
attached their GPS device to Harry Katzin‟s van, they had no 
way of knowing when the next Rite Aid robbery would take 
place.  We likewise disagree with our Dissenting colleague‟s 
assessment of Maynard.  (Dissent at 29-31.)  The good faith 
51 
True, the police did not act in a total vacuum, but their chosen 
course of action when presented with such a novel 
constitutional situation is nonetheless troubling:  In lieu of a 
binding proclamation from either this Circuit or the Supreme 
Court — and instead of seeking approval from a neutral 
magistrate — law enforcement personnel looked to other 
(non-binding or distinguishable) authorities like our sister 
circuits‟ decisions.  Essentially, they extrapolated their own 
constitutional rule and applied it to this case.  We fail to see 
how this absolves their behavior.  The assumption by law 
enforcement personnel that their own self-derived rule 
sanctioned their conduct — to say nothing of their unstated 
belief that this Circuit would automatically side with a 
majority of the minority of our sister circuits — was 
constitutionally culpable.
23
 
                                                                                                     
exception analysis cannot be post-hoc, and the police action 
at issue must be analyzed under the circumstances as they 
existed at the time the action was taken — in this case, before 
the police knew when their GPS surveillance would end. 
23
 The Government suggests that the good faith exception 
should apply because the police sought confirmation from 
“experienced government attorneys.”  (Appellant Br. at 56.)  
The Government cites Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 
1235 (2012), for the proposition that it shows good faith on 
the part of an officer if he obtains “approval of the warrant 
application from a superior and a prosecutor before 
submitting it to a magistrate.”  (Appellant Br. at 57.)  
However, Messerschmidt is inapposite.  That case considered 
good faith in the context of an officer relying on a warrant 
that had been based on an allegedly paltry affidavit.  Thus, the 
opinion of a third party tended to demonstrate that the officer 
52 
 The decisions in Knotts and Katz do not remedy the 
situation.  The Government suggests that in this case law 
enforcement personnel properly reasoned that the GPS search 
did not require a warrant by analogizing to Knotts‟ discussion 
of electronic tracking devices.  Doing so, the Government 
adds, was imminently reasonable given the prevailing Fourth 
Amendment framework at the time — the privacy theory 
from Katz.  That is, the Government contends that because 
law enforcement personnel were aware that a search occurs 
when the police intrude upon a target‟s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, they acted in good faith by relying on 
our sister circuits‟ GPS decisions as well as Knotts‟ statement 
that, among other things, “[a] person travelling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.”  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.  We find such reasoning 
                                                                                                     
had not acted with knowledge of the affidavit‟s deficiency.  In 
the instant case, the police lack even an affidavit.  Moreover, 
a government attorney‟s approval, standing alone, cannot and 
should not suffice to demonstrate good faith.  Cf. Leon, 468 
U.S. at 914 (“[T]he courts must also insist that the magistrate 
purport to perform his neutral and detached function and not 
serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police. . . . [A 
magistrate] who acts instead as an adjunct law enforcement 
officer cannot provide valid authorization for an otherwise 
unconstitutional search.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Thus, while we agree that it is another “factor to consider,” 
(Oral Argument Tr. at 51-52; Dissent at 33), we nonetheless 
hold that, in this case, seeking the advice of a “government 
attorney[]” does not offer much support to the Government‟s 
position. 
53 
dangerous for the reasons already articulated above:  Law 
enforcement can always derive some constitutional principle 
from existing decisions — which is particularly true when 
they also look directly to a generalized baseline case like 
Katz.  It cannot be that the good faith exception applies in 
every instance when the police act in reliance on such a self-
derived principle.  If it did, then all Fourth Amendment 
protections would be rendered ineffective — the police could 
intrude upon anyone‟s Fourth Amendment rights without fear 
of suppression merely by relying on a particularly broad-
sweeping, self-derived constitutional principle.  We fear that 
accepting the Government‟s position, in effect, would lead to 
the good faith exception swallowing the exclusionary rule.
24
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 The Dissent argues that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
41 — particularly the 2006 advisory committee notes to that 
rule — further supports a finding that the law enforcement 
officers in this case acted with an objectively good faith belief 
that their conduct was constitutional.  (Dissent at 32.)  In 
particular, the Dissent points to the following language from 
the 2006 advisory committee notes:  “If . . . the officers intend 
to install and use [a tracking device] without implicating any 
Fourth Amendment rights, there is no need to obtain a 
warrant.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b) advisory committee‟s note 
(2006) (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. 276).  This language, 
however, stands for nothing more than the unremarkable 
proposition that the police need not obtain a warrant if their 
action does not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Without our 
(or the Supreme Court‟s) having ruled on the matter, 
however, the police could not reasonably say that the use of a 
GPS tracker would not “implicat[e] . . . Fourth Amendment 
rights.”  Indeed, even under the most generous rationale, this 
54 
 Moreover, since such constitutionally reckless action 
was the Government‟s default choice in this case, we hold 
that applying the exclusionary rule aptly serves its intended 
purpose: to “deter future Fourth Amendment violations.”  
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426; see also id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“[W]hen police decide to conduct a search or 
seizure in the absence of case law (or other authority) 
specifically sanctioning such action, exclusion of the 
evidence obtained may deter Fourth Amendment 
violations . . . .”).  The police practice at issue here effectively 
disregarded the possibility that we could find a GPS search to 
constitute a Fourth Amendment violation requiring a warrant.  
But a Fourth Amendment violation is a Fourth Amendment 
violation.  While the police may feel free to act with 
impunity, confident in the illusory protection of non-binding 
precedent, each search could still be violating the 
Constitution.  Thus, where we have not yet ruled on the 
constitutionality of a police tactic, law enforcement personnel 
have two choices: (a) assume that their conduct violates the 
Fourth Amendment and that we will require them to obtain a 
warrant, or (b) gamble, at the risk of having evidence 
excluded, that we will find no Fourth Amendment violation in 
                                                                                                     
language could only have favored the Government‟s 
argument if the GPS search occurred prior to the Maynard 
decision (i.e., before any circuit had suggested that GPS 
searches violated the Fourth Amendment).  However, once 
the circuits split on the issue of whether using a GPS tracker 
constitutes a search, law enforcement officials were on notice 
that such devices could “implicat[e] . . . Fourth Amendment 
rights” and the commentary became borderline irrelevant for 
good faith purposes. 
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a particular situation.
25
  This is in line with the Supreme 
Court‟s suggestion that law enforcement officials should be 
incentivized to “err on the side of constitutional behavior.”  
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982).
26
  
                                              
25
 We do not hold, of course, that the police can never make 
assumptions about our future Fourth Amendment rulings.  We 
merely hold that where law enforcement personnel choose to 
take the constitutional analysis into their own hands, they 
effectively do so without a safety net:  If their analysis is 
correct and we ultimately affirm the constitutionality of a 
search, then the police are rewarded with full use of any 
evidence derived from the search.  If their analysis is wrong, 
however, and the search is ultimately held to be 
unconstitutional, then the police cannot avoid the cost of 
suppression by relying on the good faith exception.  Just as 
the police enjoy the benefits when they are correct, so, too, do 
they bear the costs when they are wrong.  Of course, the 
police can avoid this entire issue by requesting a warrant in 
the first instance. 
26
 Johnson addressed retroactive application of Fourth 
Amendment decisions.  In discussing the matter, the Court 
stated: 
If, as the Government argues, all rulings resolving unsettled 
Fourth Amendment questions should be nonretroactive, then, 
in close cases, law enforcement officials would have little 
incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior.  
Official awareness of the dubious constitutionality of a 
practice would be counterbalanced by official certainty that, 
so long as the Fourth Amendment law in the area remained 
unsettled, evidence obtained through the questionable practice 
would be excluded only in the one case definitively resolving 
56 
Excluding the evidence in this case would incentivize just that 
and would therefore result in “appreciable deterrence” of 
future Fourth Amendment violations.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 909 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Thus, heeding the Supreme Court‟s views in Herring 
and Davis, and after considering the Government‟s various 
arguments, we find that the “deterrent effect of suppression 
[in this case is] substantial and outweigh[s] any harm to the 
justice system.”  Herring, 555 U.S. at 147.  The police acted 
in the face of unsettled law at a time when courts were 
becoming more attuned to the argument that warrantless GPS 
surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment.  Excluding the 
evidence here will incentivize the police to err on the side of 
constitutional behavior and help prevent future Fourth 
Amendment violations.  We therefore conclude that the police 
actions taken here do not qualify under the good faith 
exception and hold that the exclusionary rule should apply in 
this case.
27
 
                                                                                                     
the unsettled question.  Failure to accord any retroactive 
effect to Fourth Amendment rulings would encourage police 
or other courts to disregard the plain purport of our decisions 
and to adopt a let‟s-wait-until-it‟s-decided approach. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. at 561 (footnote and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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 It bears noting that we do not deal here with a situation 
where some on-point binding precedent exists.  That is, we 
are not presented with a case wherein law enforcement 
personnel were asked to apply on-point binding appellate law 
to a new factual scenario.  Indeed, we recognize that applying 
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V.     STANDING AND THE KATZIN BROTHERS 
 Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, and a 
defendant seeking to suppress evidence must therefore 
demonstrate a violation of his own Fourth Amendment rights 
before he can be granted any form of relief.  See Minnesota v. 
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998); United States v. Mosley, 454 
F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2006).  Thus, having held that the 
District Court rightly suppressed the evidence found in Harry 
Katzin‟s van, we must now consider whether all three of the 
brothers had standing to challenge the admissibility of this 
evidence.  The Government would have us divide the stop 
into two distinct incidents: (1) the stop of Harry Katzin and 
(2) the stop of Mark and Michael Katzin, with each stop 
presenting a different constitutional situation.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we hold that the stop of Harry Katzin‟s van 
must be treated as a single incident implicating the Fourth 
Amendment rights of all three brothers and, consequently, we 
find that all three had standing. 
                                                                                                     
existing precedential frameworks to subtle factual 
permutations is something that police officers — and other 
law enforcement personnel — do all the time.  We have no 
occasion (or desire) to curtail such practices in this opinion.  
Thus, for example, we do not purport to limit the ability of an 
officer to decide whether a particular situation gives rise to 
exigent circumstances while standing outside an apartment 
door with suspicious sounds emanating from within.  Such a 
case could lead to a different outcome under the Herring and 
Davis balancing test given that, unlike here, the officer would 
not be leaping recklessly into an unexplored constitutional 
situation. 
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 We begin by stating the obvious:  There is not, nor can 
there be, any dispute as to whether Harry Katzin — as the 
owner of the van — has standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the GPS search as well as the stop and 
subsequent search of his van, and to seek suppression of any 
evidence discovered within the vehicle.  Indeed, the 
Government concedes as much.  (Appellant Br. at 69.)  
Certainly, then, the District Court rightly suppressed the 
evidence as against Harry Katzin. 
 The Government does challenge the standing of Mark 
and Michael Katzin.  (Id. at 67-74.)  Since “a search of a car 
does not implicate the rights of non-owner passengers,” the 
Government contends that such passengers are “generally 
held to lack „standing‟ to object to evidence discovered in a 
search of a vehicle.”  Mosley, 454 F.3d at 253 (citing Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 147 (1978)).  This much is true.  
However, we have also held that “when a vehicle is illegally 
stopped by the police, no evidence found during the stop may 
be used by the government against any occupant of the 
vehicle unless the government can show that the taint of the 
illegal stop was purged.”  Id. at 251.28 
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 We explicitly noted in Mosley that courts “should not be 
distracted by the fact that this case involves evidence found in 
a car.”  Mosley, 454 F.3d at 253.  As Mosley explained, the 
constitutional violation stems not from the “search of the car . 
. . [but] the seizure of [the passenger].”  Id. at 253 & n.6 (“[A] 
Fourth Amendment seizure of every occupant occurs the 
moment that vehicle is pulled over by the police.”)  The same 
is true of the case at bar: while the police did search Harry 
Katzin‟s van, this was done only after pulling the van to the 
side of the road, thereby “seizing” all three brothers. 
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 This Court in United States v. Mosley considered the 
illegal stop and subsequent search of a vehicle carrying three 
individuals, during the course of which the police discovered 
several firearms from the car.  We held that the stop and 
subsequent search of the car was to be treated as a single 
event, thereby rejecting an approach that would split the 
inquiry between several “individual constitutional violations, 
each with [its own] victim, each of whom may seek to 
suppress only the fruits of the violation of his individual 
rights.”  Id. at 257-58.  In part, this conclusion was 
occasioned by our holding that “[t]he relationship between 
the seizure of a passenger in a moving vehicle, which 
necessarily occurs when that vehicle is stopped by the police, 
and the subsequent discovery of evidence during that stop, is 
one of ineluctable and undeniable correlation.”  Id. at 266.  
Additionally, while we acknowledged that “Fourth 
Amendment rights are personal rights,” we also expressly 
rejected “blind adherence to a phrase which at most has 
superficial clarity and which conceals underneath that thin 
veneer all of the problems of line drawing which must be 
faced in any conscientious effort to apply the Fourth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 267 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 147).  
In light of our decision in Mosley, Mark and Michael Katzin 
argue that they have standing to challenge the admissibility of 
evidence seized from Harry Katzin‟s van by virtue of being 
subjected to an illegal stop that thereby rendered any evidence 
discovered in Harry Katzin‟s van fruit of the poisonous tree.  
Id. at 256 (“Where the traffic stop itself is illegal, it is simply 
impossible for the police to obtain the challenged evidence 
without violating the passenger‟s Fourth Amendment rights.”)  
We agree.
29
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 It bears noting that Mark and Michael Katzin challenge the 
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 True, precedent exists to support the proposition that 
an individual cannot challenge the legality of a search which 
was executed based on information obtained as a 
consequence of some illegal search or seizure of a third party.  
See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 692 F.2d 69, 70-71 (9th Cir. 
1982).  Such holdings are premised on the principle 
underlying the Government‟s position:  Fourth Amendment 
rights “are personal and may be enforced by exclusion of 
evidence only by one whose own legal rights and interests 
were infringed by the search and seizure.”  Id. (discussing 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128).  The presence of Mosley, 
however, alters this analysis. 
 The Government effectively contends that we must 
treat the stop of Harry Katzin‟s van as constituting two stops:  
The first, a stop (i.e., seizure) of Harry Katzin himself as a 
result of the GPS search.  The second, a stop of Mark and 
Michael Katzin based on the probable cause developed 
through use of information derived from the GPS search.  The 
Government would have us evaluate the legality and 
attendant Fourth Amendment consequences (if any) of each 
stop individually.  We rejected this individualized approach in 
Mosley, holding instead that “an illegal traffic stop of a car 
occupied by a driver and a passenger [constitutes] a single 
constitutional violation, with [multiple] victims, each of 
whom can seek to suppress all fruits of that violation.”  
Mosley, 454 F.3d at 257-58; id. at 267 (“It defies common 
                                                                                                     
stop of Harry Katzin‟s van, not the GPS search itself.  That in 
the course of challenging the stop this Court must necessarily 
consider the constitutionality of the GPS search is merely 
incidental:  Mark and Michael seek to vindicate their own 
rights, not those of their brother. 
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sense and common experience to transmute one action into 
three, and we will not endorse a Fourth Amendment approach 
that relies on such a transmutation.”)  In effect, then, the 
illegality of the stop as it related to Harry Katzin is extended 
to his brothers (passengers).  Consequently, we hold that 
Mark and Michael had standing to contest the stop and that 
the District Court rightly suppressed the evidence as to all 
three brothers. 
VI.     CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the 
District Court‟s suppression of evidence discovered inside of 
Harry Katzin‟s van. 
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VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
  
To briefly recap: In December 2010, law enforcement 
officers, after consulting an Assistant United States Attorney, 
and in accord with the general policy of the United States 
Department of Justice, magnetically attached an 
independently battery operated ―slap on‖ Global Positioning 
System device (―GPS device‖ or ―GPS‖) upon the 
undercarriage of Harry Katzin‘s vehicle, while that vehicle 
was parked on a public street.  It was conceded at argument 
that the officers had probable cause to do so, although they 
did not obtain a warrant.  For two days, law enforcement used 
that GPS to track the vehicle‘s whereabouts on public roads.  
The vehicle never entered a private garage, never entered the 
curtilage of a home, nor did it enter a similarly private area.  
The information from that GPS then led to the seizure of 
evidence and the arrest of Harry Katzin and his two brothers, 
due to their involvement in a major ongoing scheme to steal 
drugs from Rite Aid pharmacies.  
  
At that time, the Supreme Court, in cases involving 
electronic beepers in vehicles, had held that ―[a] person 
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one 
place to another.‖  United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 
(1983); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713–16 
(1984).  All but one of the United States Court of Appeals to 
have addressed the issue, in light of Knotts, Karo, and other 
general Fourth Amendment principles, held that GPS or 
similar electronic surveillance (―GPS-like device‖ or ―GPS-
like‖) could be conducted in the same way that occurred here: 
without an authorizing warrant.  This view was reflected in 
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then-current Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, the commentary to which stated that a warrant was 
not required to conduct electronic vehicle surveillance ―[i]f . . 
. the officers intend to install and use [an electronic 
surveillance] device without implicating any Fourth 
Amendment rights.‖  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) advisory comm. 
note (2006).  No decision from our Circuit was on point.  
Then came United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (2012). 
 
In light of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Jones, and 
for the reasons discussed in the majority opinion, I agree that 
the Fourth Amendment now requires law enforcement 
officers to obtain a warrant, issued upon probable cause, 
before they install a GPS or a GPS-like device on a person‘s 
automobile, or other mobile property, and thereafter use that 
device to conduct continuing surveillance.  See Majority 
Opinion (―Maj. Op.‖) at 18.1 
 
I disagree, however, with the majority‘s conclusion 
that the District Court was correct to suppress the evidence 
obtained as a result of the warrantless GPS installation and 
subsequent surveillance.  See Maj. Op. at 34–56.  Given pre-
Jones Supreme Court precedent, the consensus regarding 
GPS and GPS-like use across the federal courts, and other 
relevant considerations, I would hold that the law 
enforcement officers here acted ―with an objectively 
‗reasonable good-faith belief‘ that their conduct [was] 
                                              
 
1
 I also agree with the majority that, under our decision 
in United States v. Mosely, 454 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2006), each 
of the Katzin brothers has standing to seek suppression of the 
evidence obtained from Harry Katzin‘s vehicle. 
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lawful.‖  Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 
2427 (2011) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
909 (1984)).  For that reason, suppression in this case is 
unwarranted, and I would reverse the District Court.   
 
I.   
  
It is indisputable that the installation and use of the 
GPS device in this case was a ―search‖ under the Fourth 
Amendment.  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.  Furthermore, I 
agree with the majority that this particular search now 
requires a warrant, and that because the law enforcement 
officers here acted without a warrant a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment occurred.  But ―[t]he fact that a Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred . . . does not necessarily mean 
that the exclusionary rule applies.‖  Herring v. United States, 
555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009); United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 
140, 151 (3d Cir. 2010).  See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 223 (1983) (―[W]hether the exclusionary rule‘s remedy 
is appropriate in a particular context has long been regarded 
as an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth 
Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule 
were violated by police conduct.‖). 
  
The exclusionary rule ―is a ‗prudential‘ doctrine,‖ 
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426 (quoting Pa. Bd. of Probation and 
Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)), utilized to 
―compel respect for the constitutional guaranty‖ embodied in 
the Fourth Amendment, id. (quoting Elkins v. United States, 
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).  See also United States v. Brown, 
631 F.3d 638, 646 (3d Cir. 2011) (―[T]he exclusionary rule is 
merely a ‗judicially created remedy designed to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent 
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effect.‘‖ (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 
348 (1974))).  Suppression of evidence obtained through a 
violation of the Constitution is ―‗not a personal constitutional 
right,‘ nor is it designed to ‗redress the injury‘ occasioned by 
an unconstitutional search.‖  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426 
(quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)).  And 
introduction of illegally obtained evidence at trial ―work[s] no 
new Fourth Amendment wrong.‖  Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354.   
Instead, the exclusionary rule‘s ―sole purpose . . . is to deter 
future Fourth Amendment violations.‖  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 
2426.   
  
But application of the exclusionary rule is not 
warranted ―in every circumstance in which it might provide 
marginal deterrence.‖  Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 (quoting 
Scott, 524 U.S. at 368).  Suppression is prudent only where it 
would ―result in appreciable deterrence.‖  Leon, 468 U.S. at 
909 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 
U.S. 433, 454 (1976)); see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426–27 
(explaining that ―[w]here suppression fails to yield 
‗appreciable deterrence,‘ exclusion is ‗clearly unwarranted‘‖ 
(omission omitted) (quoting Janis, 428 U.S. at 454)); 
Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 (same); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 
1, 11 (1995) (same); Virgin Islands v. John, 654 F.3d 412, 
417 (3d Cir. 2011) (same).  In other words, suppression is 
warranted only where its deterrence benefits outweigh the 
substantial social costs inherent in ―preclud[ing] 
consideration of reliable, probative evidence.‖  Scott, 524 
U.S. at 364; see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (―For 
exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of 
suppression must outweigh its heavy costs.‖); Tracey, 597 
F.3d at 151 (―To determine whether to apply the rule in a 
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particular case, we weigh the benefits of the rule‘s deterrent 
effects against the costs of exclusion . . . .‖).   
 
The costs of suppression are substantial.  ―Exclusion 
exacts a heavy toll on both the judicial system and society at 
large.‖  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427.  ―The principal cost of 
applying the rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly 
dangerous defendants go free—something that ‗offends basic 
concepts of the criminal justice system.‘‖  Herring, 555 U.S. 
at 141 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 908).  But in addition to its 
―costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement 
objectives,‖ Scott, 524 U.S. at 364–65 (internal quotation 
mark omitted), ―[i]ndiscriminate application of the 
exclusionary rule,‖ in some circumstances, ―may well 
‗generate disrespect for the law and administration of 
justice,‘‖ Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 (alteration omitted) (quoting 
Stone, 428 U.S. at 491).  Consequently, ―[o]ur cases hold that 
society must swallow this bitter pill when necessary, but only 
as a ‗last resort.‘‖  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Hudson 
v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)).  
 
Against these costs, ―we weigh the benefits of the 
rule‘s deterrent effects.‖  Tracey, 597 F.3d at 151.  But we 
must fight any instinct to ―‗reflexive[ly]‘ appl[y]‖ the rule.  
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Evans, 514 U.S. at 13).  
The necessary analysis calls for a ―rigorous weighing of [the] 
costs and deterrence benefits,‖ focusing primarily ―on the 
‗flagrancy of the police misconduct‘ at issue.‖  Id. (quoting 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 911).  See also John, 654 F.3d at 417 
(explaining that the exclusionary rule is ―trigger[ed]‖ only 
where police conduct is ―sufficiently deliberate that exclusion 
can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such 
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deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system‖ 
(quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144)).   
 
Of course, ―the deterrence benefits of exclusion ‗vary 
with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct‘ at 
issue.‖  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (alteration omitted) (quoting 
Herring, 555 U.S. at 143).  On the one hand, ―[w]hen the 
police exhibit ‗deliberate,‘ ‗reckless,‘ or ‗grossly negligent‘ 
disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of 
exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs.‖  
Id. (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144); see also John, 654 
F.3d at 418 (condoning suppression where police conduct was 
―‗deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent‘‖ (quoting Tracey, 
597 F.3d at 151)).  But on the other hand, ―when the police 
act with an objectively ‗reasonable good-faith belief‘ that 
their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves only 
simple, ‗isolated‘ negligence, the deterrence rationale loses 
much of its force, and exclusion cannot ‗pay its way.‘‖ Davis, 
131 S. Ct. at 2427–28 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 137; Leon, 468 U.S. at 
909, 908 n.6, 919). 
 
Under this so-called ―good-faith‖ exception to the 
exclusionary rule, beginning with United States v. Leon, the 
Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the costs of 
suppression are not outweighed by the little, if any, deterrent 
benefit of suppressing evidence obtained ―in [a] reasonable 
good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with 
the Fourth Amendment.‖  Leon, 468 U.S. at 909 (quoting 
Gates, 412 U.S. at 255 (White, J., concurring)); see also 
Evans, 514 U.S. at 11–12 (―[W]here the officer‘s conduct is 
objectively reasonable, excluding the evidence will not 
further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable 
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way . . . .‖ (alteration in original) (internal quotation mark 
omitted) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 919–20)); Illinois v. 
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348–49 (1987) (―[E]vidence should be 
suppressed ‗only if it can be said that the law enforcement 
officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with 
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment.‘‖ (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 
U.S. 531, 542 (1975))); Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23 (―[O]ur 
good faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable 
question whether a reasonably well trained officer would 
have known that the search was illegal . . . .‖).  Under such 
circumstances, ―a reasonable officer cannot have been 
expected to know that what he was doing was 
unconstitutional,‖ and, as a result, ―he is unlikely to be 
discouraged in his actions by the knowledge that the fruits of 
his unconstitutional searches will be suppressed.‖  John, 654 
F.3d at 417.  Thus, at bottom, ―the harsh sanction of exclusion 
‗should not be applied to deter objectively reasonable law 
enforcement activity.‘‖  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429 (quoting 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 919). 
 
II.   
 
Admittedly, the majority posits several pages focused 
on the balancing test outlined in Herring and Davis; the test 
which I describe at length above.  See supra Part I.  But while 
purporting to consider whether, ―in light of all the 
circumstances in this case,‖ the law enforcement officers‘ 
conduct ―rises to the level of a ‗deliberate, reckless, or grossly 
negligent‘ violation of the Fourth Amendment,‖ Maj. Op. at 
48, the majority fragments its analysis by discussing whether 
Knotts and Karo and the cases from our sister circuits 
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addressing GPS and GPS-like devices are ―binding appellate 
precedent‖ under Davis.  
 
Of course, the question of whether Davis‘s specific 
holding—that is, that law enforcement reliance on ―binding 
appellate precedent‖ qualifies as objective good-faith 
conduct—lingers in the background of this case.  In the event 
the Government were arguing that the law enforcement 
officers here relied on ―binding appellate precedent,‖ I would 
have no qualms with the majority addressing whether Knotts 
and Karo and the relevant cases from our sister courts 
properly qualified under that moniker.  But, as the majority 
makes clear, that is not the Government‘s argument.  
 
Furthermore, although a seemingly reasonable 
analytical choice, the majority‘s decision to first address 
whether those cases qualify as ―binding appellate precedent‖ 
later infects the more general good-faith analysis.  That is, the 
majority allows its conclusion that the ―Beeper Cases‖ and 
the ―Out-of-Circuit GPS Cases‖ are not ―binding appellate 
precedent‖ to emaciate the weight given to law enforcement 
reliance thereon in the more general good-faith analysis.   
 
In effect, the majority‘s search for Davis-like ―binding 
appellate precedent‖ in this case places a heavy thumb on the 
scale in favor of suppression.  Such an analysis does not 
comply with the Leon line of cases, which, since their 
inception, have time and again stated that the touchstone for 
the good-faith exception is ―‗the objectively ascertainable 
question whether a reasonably well trained officer would 
have known that the search was illegal‘ in light of ‗all of the 
circumstances,‘‖ Herring, 555 U.S. at 145 (quoting Leon, 468 
U.S. at 922 n.23); not whether the officers relied upon 
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―binding appellate precedent,‖ or ―some seemingly 
immutable authority or information,‖ as the majority implies.  
See Maj. Op. at 36; see also id. at 49 (―Try as we might to 
allay our concerns, we remain supremely discomfited by the 
lack of binding appellate guidance underlying the police 
action in this case.‖).   
 
At bottom, the majority claims that this case is 
―different.‖  The officers here acted ―different[ly],‖ (and, 
thus, sufficiently culpable so as to justify application of the 
exclusionary rule), the majority concludes, because the 
officers relied on ―non-binding precedent‖ from our sister 
circuits and ―extrapolate[ed] from, or analogiz[ed] to, existing 
case law‖ rather than seeking a warrant.  Maj. Op. at 50.  But 
the conclusion that this case is ―different‖ results primarily 
from the majority‘s prior determinations that analogous and 
non-binding precedent are materially ―different‖ from the 
―binding appellate precedent‖ dealt with in Davis; and, thus, 
without ―binding appellate precedent,‖ the rationale of Davis 
and the other good-faith cases do not apply.   
 
I do not think this case is ―different‖ from other cases 
involving the good-faith exception, where courts are 
presented with specific facts and particularities and then 
asked whether ―a reasonably well trained officer would have 
known that the search [conducted] was illegal in light of all 
the circumstances.‖  Herring, 555 U.S. at 145 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 
n.23).  Davis is obviously important because the facts in that 
case—officer reliance on ―binding appellate precedent‖—are 
the most analogous of the Supreme Court‘s several good-faith 
cases with which the Government, and we, have to work.  
Regardless, the predominant importance of Davis is its 
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affirmation of deterrence and police culpability as the 
lynchpins of the exclusionary rule analysis.  The majority 
thus erroneously elevates the ―binding appellate precedent‖ 
language to its own good-faith test instead of treating it as a 
single consideration in the exclusionary rule analysis.  
 
Nevertheless, ―of great significance to the instant 
case,‖ the majority insists, ―is the fact that in Davis the police 
relied on binding appellate precedent that ‗specifically 
authorize[d the] particular police practice.‘‖  Maj. Op. at 39 
(quoting Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429).  Thus, the majority 
stresses, that Davis must be read as ―extend[ing] good faith 
protection only to acts that are explicitly sanctioned by clear 
and well-settled precedent.‖  Maj. Op. at 40.  First, I take 
great issue with the majority‘s suggestion that the good-faith 
exception was ―extend[ed]‖ by Davis, or any other case, 
―only‖ to the specific factual circumstances therein.  Courts 
apply a single good-faith exception to either condone or 
condemn varying factual circumstances.  See Davis, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2428 (―The Court has over time applied [the] ‗good-
faith‘ exception across a range of cases.‖). 
 
More importantly, the Davis dissent, other courts, and 
commentators do not read the Davis majority‘s articulation of 
the good-faith exception as limited to only ―binding appellate 
precedent.‖  See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2439 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (―[A]n officer who conducts a search that he 
believes complies with the Constitution but which, it 
ultimately turns out, falls just outside the Fourth 
Amendment‘s bounds is no more culpable than an officer 
who follows erroneous ‗binding precedent.‘  Nor is an officer 
more culpable where circuit precedent is simply suggestive 
rather than ‗binding,‘ where it only describes how to treat 
11 
 
roughly analogous instances, or where it just does not exist.‖); 
United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2013) (―The 
[Davis] Court‘s emphasis on the absence of police culpability 
could be read to imply that good-faith reliance on out-of-
circuit appellate precedent is also acceptable.‖); United States 
v. Baez, 878 F. Supp. 2d 288, 294–95 (D. Mass. 2012) (―Baez 
argues that Davis should be limited to its precise holding. . . . 
[But] th[at] interpretation is entirely too static . . . . It is 
apparent that both the majority opinion and the concurring 
and dissenting opinions anticipated the principles of Davis 
would be worked out in subsequent cases raising themes and 
variations.‖); Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and 
Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v. Greene 
and Davis v. United States, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 
255 (2011) (―If the exclusionary rule solely concerns 
culpability . . . its [sic] hard to see why binding precedent is 
required.  Reliance on binding precedent seems inherently 
reasonable, but reliance is often reasonable without binding 
precedent.  A local police officer who conducts a search 
widely upheld among the circuits but not yet addressed by the 
[U.S. Court of Appeals] in his jurisdiction is no more 
culpable than an officer who conducts a search upheld only 
by his regional circuit.  If the former has acted reasonably, 
then surely so has the latter.‖).2 
                                              
2
 The majority supports its limiting reading of Davis 
by pointing to the opinion below from the Eleventh Circuit, 
and several similar cases from our sister circuits, wherein 
courts ―stress. . . that [the] precedent on a given point must be 
unequivocal before [those courts would] suspend the 
exclusionary rule‘s operation.‖ United States v. Davis, 598 
F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. 
McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 (10th Cir. 2009) (―Relying 
12 
 
Finally, the majority argues that Davis itself forecloses 
the conclusion that law enforcement reliance on analogous or 
non-binding out-of-circuit precedent could ever constitute 
good faith.  Quoting language from Davis,
3
 the majority 
                                                                                                     
upon the settled case law of a United States Court of Appeals 
certainly qualifies as an objectively reasonable law 
enforcement behavior.‖); United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 
853, 866 (5th Cir. 1987) (―The exclusionary rule should not 
be applied to searches which relied on Fifth Circuit law prior 
to the change of that law . . . .‖); id. at 878 (Hill, J., 
concurring) (―Outside of situations where we have authorized 
the specific conduct undertaken and then later declared it 
unconstitutional, I believe the analogy to Leon and Krull 
weakens and the exception should probably not be applied.‖).  
But the Supreme Court refrained from creating a similar 
restraint.  See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2435–36 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (noting that Davis left ―the markedly different 
question [of] whether the exclusionary rule applies when the 
law governing the constitutionality of a particular search is 
unsettled . . . unanswered‖).  I therefore hesitate before 
reading into Davis a limitation apparently at odds with its 
rationale.  See Kerr, supra at 255. 
 
3
 The language quoted by the majority reads as 
follows: 
This Court reviews criminal convictions from 
12 Federal Courts of Appeals, 50 state courts of 
last resort, and the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals.  If one or even many of these courts 
uphold a particular type of search or seizure, 
defendants in jurisdictions in which the 
question remains open will still have an 
13 
 
claims that the case explained that ―its holding was limited to 
jurisdiction[s] where the law was clearly settled.‖  Maj. Op. at 
42 n.17.  But the language to which the majority refers, 
quoted in full at footnote 3, supra, is pure dicta, responding 
not to an argument about what the good-faith exception 
should or should not apply to but to the policy concern that 
―applying the good-faith exception to searches conducted in 
reliance on binding precedent will stunt the development of 
Fourth Amendment law.‖  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2432; see also 
id. at 2433 (―[A]pplying the good-faith exception in this 
context will not prevent judicial reconsideration of prior 
Fourth Amendment precedents.‖).4  Furthermore, directly 
                                                                                                     
undiminished incentive to litigate the issue.  
This Court can then grant certiorari, and the 
development of Fourth Amendment law will in 
no way be stunted. 
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2433. 
 
 
4
 As an aside, I fail to see how allowing law 
enforcement reliance on analogous or non-binding out-of-
circuit precedent to influence substantially the good-faith 
analysis would foreclose development of Fourth Amendment 
law.  Leon made clear that ―[t]here is no need for courts to 
adopt the inflexible practice of always deciding whether the 
officers‘ conduct manifested objective good faith before 
turning to the question [of] whether the Fourth Amendment 
has been violated.‖  468 U.S. at 924.  ―Defendants seeking 
suppression of the fruits of allegedly unconstitutional 
searches or seizures undoubtedly raise live controversies‖ 
which federal courts are ―empower[ed] . . . to adjudicate‖; 
and ―courts have considerable discretion in conforming their 
14 
 
preceding this brief discussion, the Court reiterated that the 
sole focus of the exclusionary rule is ―deterrence of culpable 
law-enforcement conduct.‖  Id. at 2432–33. 
 
In short, I disagree with the way the majority‘s opinion 
reads to suggest that Davis alone answers the questions 
presented in this appeal.  In Davis, the Court was presented 
with a unique set of facts to which its holding was expressly 
directed: officer reliance on ―binding appellate precedent‖ 
later overruled.  See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429.  Identified by 
both the concurrence and the dissent, Davis did not touch the 
questions of ―whether the exclusionary rule applies when the 
law governing the constitutionality of a particular search is 
unsettled,‖ id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), or ―where 
circuit precedent is simply suggestive rather than ‗binding,‘ 
where it only describes how to treat roughly analogous 
instances, or where it just does not exist,‖ id. at 2439 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting).   
 
Of paramount importance to this case is that the 
reasoning underlying Davis does address those questions.  
Davis and the Court‘s good-faith jurisprudence teach us that 
we must look at the totality of the circumstances and ask 
whether, in light of those circumstances, the officers were 
acting with ―deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent 
disregard for Fourth Amendment rights,‖ which would justify 
suppression, or, instead, whether they were acting ―with an 
objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct 
[was] lawful‖ or ―involve[d] only simple, isolated 
negligence.‖  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427–28 (citations and 
                                                                                                     
decisionmaking processes to the exigencies of particular 
cases.‖  Id. at 924–25. 
15 
 
internal quotation marks omitted).  For that reason, I disagree 
with the majority‘s conclusion that authority falling outside 
the specific semblance of Davis is ―different‖ and thus always 
insufficient to support a finding of good-faith in every 
circumstance. 
 
In Davis, the Court explained that Leon ―imported‖ the 
reasoning of United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) 
―into the good-faith inquiry.‖  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2432.  In 
Peltier, border patrol agents conducted a stop-and-search of 
an automobile ―within a reasonable distance from‖ the 
Mexican border pursuant to a federal statute, federal 
regulations promulgated in accordance with that statute, and a 
―continuous judicial approval‖ of ―the statute and the . . . 
policy‖ across the federal courts.  Peltier, 422 U.S. at 540–42.  
Although that statute and policy were overturned by the 
Court‘s decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 
U.S. 266 (1973), the Peltier Court refrained from applying 
the exclusionary rule.  See id. at 542.   
 
Essential to the Peltier Court‘s decision was the now-
familiar reasoning that ―evidence obtained from a search 
should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law 
enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be 
charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment.‖  Id.  Especially relevant here, 
the Court stated that ―unless we are to hold that parties may 
not reasonably rely upon any legal pronouncement emanating 
from sources other than this Court, we cannot regard as 
blameworthy those parties who conform their conduct to the 
prevailing statutory or constitutional norm.‖  Id.   
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Thus, if the logic of Peltier was ―imported . . . into the 
good-faith inquiry‖ as Davis states, 131 S. Ct. at 2432, then a 
―uniform treatment‖ of a particular law enforcement act by 
the federal judiciary or a ―prevailing . . . norm‖ can, in the 
proper circumstances, support a finding of good faith.  See 
Herring, 555 U.S. at 145 (―‗[O]ur good-faith inquiry is 
confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a 
reasonably well trained officer would have known that the 
search was illegal‘ in light of ‗all the circumstances.‘‖ 
(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23)); cf. United States v. 
Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 347 n.12 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that 
―[t]he objective reasonableness of the officers‘ reliance on the 
statute . . . is further bolstered by the fact that the particular 
provision at issue had been reviewed and declared 
constitutional by several [out-of-circuit] courts‖ (citing Davis, 
131 S. Ct. at 2434)). 
 
All in all, my problem with the method of the 
majority‘s good-faith analysis is that it myopically focuses 
too much on the facts and narrow holdings of Davis and other 
good-faith cases, and considers too little, if at all, the 
reasoning and principles of law underlying those decisions.  
The majority‘s analysis is a search for some sort of 
―immutable authority or information that justifies [the law 
enforcement officers‘] course of action.‖  See Maj. Op. at 36.  
But the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is not 
limited to those circumstances.  The good-faith inquiry, like 
other Fourth Amendment analyses, requires us to ―slosh our 
way through the factbound morass of ‗reasonableness.‘‖  
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007).
5
  The question is, 
                                              
5
 The majority insinuates that my analysis would 
―burden district courts with [an unwarranted] type of case-by-
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and always has been, whether the officers acted with a 
―reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in 
accord with the Fourth Amendment.‖  Leon, 468 U.S. at 909 
(quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 255 (White, J., concurring)); see 
also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427–28; Herring, 555 U.S. at 145; 
Evans, 514 U.S. at 11–12; Krull, 480 U.S. at 348–49.  Davis 
answers ―yes‖ to police actions taken in reliance on ―binding 
appellate precedent.‖ Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429.  See also 
Herring, 555 U.S. at 147–48 (answering ―yes‖ where officers 
relied on an error in a police-maintained outstanding warrant 
database); Evans, 514 U.S. at 14–16 (answering ―yes‖ where 
officers relied on an error in court-maintained database); 
Krull, 480 U.S. at 349–50 (answering ―yes‖ where officers 
relied on a subsequently invalidated statute); Leon, 468 U.S. 
at 922 (answering ―yes‖ where officers relied on a 
subsequently invalidated warrant).  What we are asked to 
answer is whether the result is the same when officers act in 
                                                                                                     
case assessment,‖ and create ―a sprawling, amorphous, and 
self-contradicting doctrine.‖  Maj. Op. at 45.  But all of the 
questions that the majority fears—i.e., ―how many circuits 
had addressed the police practice in question, what each one 
said, whether the statements were mere dicta‖; and ―what if 
our sister courts had all ruled in near-unanimity on a point, 
with one stalwart (perhaps, highly persuasive) holdout?‖— 
are exactly the sorts of questions we should be asking; 
particularly where the Supreme Court instructs us to answer 
the good-faith question by focusing on whether ―a reasonably 
well trained officer would have known that the search 
[conducted] was illegal in light of all the circumstances.‖  
Herring, 555 U.S. at 145 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23). 
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the circumstances in which they did here.  As the following 
analysis shows, I answer that question in the affirmative. 
 
III. 
 
A. 
  
Before determining if the officers in this case acted 
with an objectively reasonable belief that their conduct 
complied with the Fourth Amendment, we must first 
determine what, precisely, their conduct was.  Jones lumps 
the police conduct that occurred here into a singular act, see 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (installation of a GPS and its use to 
monitor a vehicle are a search), as does the majority.  But 
before Jones, GPS or GPS-like surveillance was often treated 
as two distinct acts: (1) the installation of the GPS or GPS-
like device, and (2) the subsequent surveillance of the 
automobile.
6
  Thus, for the purpose of my exclusionary rule 
analysis, I find it appropriate to similarly separate the 
officers‘ conduct here into those two distinct Fourth 
Amendment acts.  See Sparks, 711 F.3d at 66–67 (bifurcating 
                                              
6
 See, e.g., Karo, 468 U.S. at 711–13 (analyzing Fourth 
Amendment implications of beeper installation); id. at  713–
18 (analyzing Fourth Amendment implications of beeper 
surveillance); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280 n.** (certiorari granted 
on Fourth Amendment implications of beeper use and 
―pass[ing]‖ on the issue of beeper installation); United States 
v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215–16 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(analyzing GPS installation separately from GPS use); United 
States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111–12 (1st Cir. 1977) (same, 
but with beepers). 
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its exclusionary rule / good-faith exception analysis with 
regard to, first, the GPS‘s installation and, second, its 
subsequent monitoring).
7
 
 
B. 
  
Application of the exclusionary rule depends on 
whether the officers, at the time they were acting, would have 
or should have known their installation of the GPS and their 
                                              
7
 I pause to note that separating GPS use into these two 
distinct Fourth Amendment acts is not appropriate for 
determining whether a Fourth Amendment search has 
occurred.  The Jones majority clearly rejected the 
concurrence‘s suggestion that it do so.  Compare Jones, 132 
S. Ct. at 951 n.5 (finding the distinction between GPS 
―installation‖ and ―use‖ irrelevant for determining whether a 
Fourth Amendment ―search‖ had occurred, reasoning ―[a] 
trespass on ‗houses‘ or ‗effects,‘ or a Katz invasion of 
privacy, is not alone a search unless it is done to obtain 
information; and the obtaining of information is not alone a 
search unless it is achieved by such a trespass or invasion of 
privacy‖), with id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) (finding it a 
―questionable proposition that [the] two procedures cannot be 
separated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment analysis,‖ 
and reasoning that it is clear that both the ―installation‖ and 
―use‖ of the GPS, on their own, do not constitute a search).  
But it is conceded that a search did occur in this case.  My 
analysis focuses on an entirely different question; to wit: 
whether the officers would have known, at the time of their 
actions, that their conduct was a ―search.‖  Because, as 
discussed in supra note 6, this question was often bifurcated 
at the time, my analysis proceeds accordingly. 
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subsequent use of the GPS to track Harry Katzin‘s vehicle 
were unconstitutional.  See Krull, 480 U.S. at 348–49.  
Relevant to this determination are the Supreme Court‘s case 
law dealing with electronic surveillance and general searches 
of automobiles, subsequent treatment of GPS and GPS-like 
surveillance across the federal courts, and other 
considerations. 
 
1. 
  
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) and 
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) are the authorities 
most relevant to our analysis.  In Knotts, Minnesota law 
enforcement officers utilized an electronic beeper to conduct 
surveillance on a vehicle driven by a man suspected to be part 
of an illegal narcotics operation.  468 U.S. at 277–80.  In 
determining the Fourth Amendment implications of that 
activity, the Court determined that the alleged search 
―amounted principally to the following of an automobile on 
public streets and highways.‖  Id. at 281.  The Court rejected 
the argument that this constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment, and held that ―[a] person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.‖8  Id.  Because when one drives an automobile on 
                                              
8
 At the time, this holding was in accord many of the 
courts of appeals to have addressed the issue.  A compelling 
number of courts found beeper surveillance did not implicate 
the Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., United States v. Michael, 
645 F.2d 252, 257–58 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding 
―subsequent monitoring,‖ after installation of beeper upon 
reasonable suspicion, ―did not violate . . . reasonable 
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expectation[s] of privacy‖); United States v. Hufford, 539 
F.2d 32, 33–34 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding one‘s movements in 
his vehicle on a public road ―were knowingly exposed to the 
public, and therefore are not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection‖), partially overruled by Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, as 
recognized by United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 
1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2012); cf. United States v. Bruneau, 594 
F.2d 1190, 1196–97 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that ―monitoring 
the airborne location of an aircraft with a [beeper] is not a 
search within the fourth amendment‖); United States v. 
Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346, 350–51 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding 
use of beeper ―as a substitute for persistent extensive visual‖ 
surveillance, when it enters a ―clandestine laboratory‖ 
exposed to ―outside viewing‖ and ―ingress and egress of the 
public‖ did not per se violate the Fourth Amendment).   
 
Alternatively, some courts alluded that it implicated a 
person‘s privacy interests, but did not hold such surveillance 
required a warrant.  See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 562 
F.2d 106, 111–12 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding beeper surveillance 
requires probable cause, but no warrant), abrogated by United 
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983), as recognized by 
United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(―Knotts . . . abrogated Moore‘s probable cause requirement 
for beeper surveillance . . . .‖); cf. United States v. Shovea, 
580 F.2d 1382, 1387–88 (10th Cir. 1978) (―The utilization of 
an electronic tracking device, without prior court approval, 
may be justified by probable cause and exigent 
circumstances.‖).  Conversely, a few cases did require a 
formal warrant; but many of those cases involved installations 
and surveillance occurring in private areas.  See, e.g., United 
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public roads, he ―voluntarily convey[s] to anyone who 
want[s] to look‖9 his location, progress, and route, he has no 
                                                                                                     
States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 944, 945–46 (6th Cir. 1980).  
That was not the case in Knotts, nor is it the case here.   
 
The Fifth Circuit at one time held that beeper 
surveillance plainly implicated the Fourth Amendment.  See 
United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 865–67 (5th Cir. 
1975) (―A person has a right to expect that when he drives his 
car into the street, the police will not attach an electronic 
surveillance device to his car in order to track him. Although 
he can anticipate visual surveillance, he can reasonably 
expect to be ‗alone‘ in his car when he enters it and drives 
away. . . . The[] failure to obtain a warrant is fatal.‖).  But that 
view seems to have been abrogated, if not overruled, by later 
pre-Knotts cases.  See Michael, supra. 
 
9
 The proposition that one has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information willingly conveyed to 
third parties remains unquestioned.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (―This Court consistently has held 
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.‖); see 
also, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 
(1988) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage bags 
willingly left on street curb for pick up by third party).  But 
see Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (―[I]t 
may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.‖). 
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reasonable privacy interest in ―whatever stops he ma[kes]‖ 
nor his ―final destination‖ or otherwise.  Id. at 281–82.10 
                                              
10
 The Knotts Court also based its holding on the 
similarly well-established ―open fields‖ doctrine, see Air 
Pollution Variance Bd. of Colo. v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 
861, 864–65 (1974); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 
(1927); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924), 
stating the beeper‘s ability to enhance visual surveillance was 
of no consequence.  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282 (―Nothing in the 
Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting 
the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such 
enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this 
case.‖); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 
(1886) (―‗The eye cannot . . . be guilty of a trespass . . . .‘‖ 
(quoting Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 
1765))).  Technological enhancements of purely visual 
surveillance have, since Knotts, received similar treatment.  
See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 488–52 (1989) (aerial 
surveillance of interior of partially covered greenhouse from a 
helicopter 400 feet overhead is not a search); Dow Chem. Co. 
v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238–39 (1986) (aerial 
photographs taken from an airplane over an industrial 
complex are not searches); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207, 211–14 (1986) (aerial surveillance of an open 
greenhouse from an airplane 1,000 feet overhead is not a 
search); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1983) 
(plurality opinion) (using flashlight to look into car interior 
and open glove compartment at night is not a search).  But see 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (use of 
infrared light technology to detect heat waves radiating off a 
home is a search because that information ―could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into 
24 
 
A little over a year later, the Court reaffirmed this 
conclusion in Karo.  But Karo clarified that the use of 
beepers to monitor cars and other objects was not without 
limits.  Only in situations in which officers employ electronic 
devices to obtain information that could otherwise be 
obtained by visual surveillance in public places are officers 
able to rely upon Knotts‘s holding.  See Karo, 468 U.S. at 
713–16.  Thus, the use of a beeper to monitor objects within 
private residences implicates the Fourth Amendment and 
requires a warrant.  See id. at 714, 717–18. 
  
What Knotts initially left undecided, however, was 
whether the installation of the beeper was a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.  See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 290 n.**; id. at 
286 (Brennan, J., concurring).  In both Knotts and Karo, the 
officers themselves neither installed nor placed the beepers 
onto or into the vehicles.  In Knotts, the officers, with the 
consent of a chemical manufacturing company, installed a 
beeper inside a container for chemicals.  The company agreed 
that the next time a suspected narcotics manufacturer came to 
purchase chemicals, they would put the chemicals he 
purchased in that particular container.  After purchasing the 
chemicals, the suspect willingly placed the bugged container 
into his car, allowing the police to easily monitor his 
movements.  460 U.S. at 278.  In Karo, the officers 
cooperated with a government informant so as to ensure that 
Karo, who was suspected of manufacturing narcotics, was 
similarly duped into purchasing a container of chemicals 
                                                                                                     
a constitutionally protected area‖ and ―the technology in 
question [was] not in general public use‖ (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 
505, 512 (1960))). 
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containing a beeper.  Once the purchase had occurred, and 
Karo placed the container in his car, the officers utilized the 
beeper to monitor his movements.  468 U.S. at 708. 
  
Karo held that where officers arrange for a suspect to 
obtain an item containing a beeper, even if the suspect has no 
knowledge of the item‘s foreign tenant, that transfer did not 
intrude upon that suspect‘s reasonable expectations of 
privacy.  Id. at 712.  In short, the transfer ―created a potential 
for an invasion of privacy,‖ but the mere fact that officers 
arranged for a beeper to come into the possession of an 
individual or into an individual‘s property ―infringed no 
privacy interest.‖  Id.  Moreover, Karo reasoned that ―[a]t 
most, there was a technical trespass on the space occupied by 
the beeper.‖  Id.  But the Court concluded that ―[t]he 
existence of a physical trespass is only marginally relevant to 
the question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been 
violated . . . , for an actual trespass is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.‖  Id. at 712–
13.
11
  As a result, the Court held that ―any impairment of . . . 
                                              
11
 Karo‘s conclusion that ―an actual trespass is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation‖ 
was, until Jones, sacrosanct in Fourth Amendment law.  In 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Supreme 
Court turned Fourth Amendment questions away from their 
common-law trespass foundation.  See 389 U.S. at 353 
(―[T]he trespass doctrine . . . can no longer be regarded as 
controlling.‖).  Thereafter, the Fourth Amendment touchstone 
was whether the government had intruded upon a person‘s 
reasonable expectations of privacy.  See id. at 360 (Harlan, J., 
concurring); see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950; United States 
v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2006) (―[T]he Fourth 
26 
 
                                                                                                     
Amendment‘s protection against unreasonable searches is 
predicated on the invasion by the government of a person‘s 
reasonable expectation of privacy . . . .‖).  For instance, in 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), the police 
officers undoubtedly trespassed upon the petitioner‘s 
property.  But, because it was found that the officers were 
trespassing upon only the ―open fields‖ of petitioner‘s 
property, he could not ―demand privacy‖ for activities 
conducted or incriminating evidence found upon that 
property.  466 U.S. at 177–78.  The vast consensus was, then, 
that a physical ―trespass‖—regardless of whether it would 
have been considered an actual ―trespass‖ under the common 
law—became a ―search‖ only when that trespass infringed 
upon a person‘s reasonable expectation of privacy.  See, e.g.,  
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (―[C]apacity to 
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not 
upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether 
the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.‖); 
United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1256–57 (3d Cir. 
1992).  Indeed, the courts of appeals addressing the Fourth 
Amendment implications of GPS and GPS-like installation 
after Knotts and Karo made little of the physical trespass that 
occurred when police installed devices directly upon 
automobiles, primarily because the invasion of privacy that 
occurred was minimal or non-existent.  See United States v. 
Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 
2007); United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1126–27 (9th 
Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 
257–58 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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privacy interests that may have occurred was occasioned by 
the monitoring of the beeper,‖ not its installation.  Id. at 
713.
12
   
 
Thus, at bottom, before Jones, Knotts and Karo 
established that no Fourth Amendment search occurred where 
officers use beeper-based electronics to monitor an 
automobile‘s movements on public roads because a person 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to that 
information.  But, because the facts of Karo correspondingly 
limited its holding, those cases did not address whether 
installation of a beeper onto or into a vehicle, in all 
circumstances, was a search.  Nonetheless, Karo‘s reasoning 
regarding the Fourth Amendment implications of a beeper 
installation on an automobile is telling, and was certainly 
informative in the subsequent treatment of the issue 
throughout the federal courts. 
 
Additionally, several other well settled Fourth 
Amendment principles are relevant.  Before Jones, the 
                                                                                                     
 
12
 The Karo Court also rejected the argument that the 
transfer of the bugged container constituted a seizure, holding 
that no ―possessory interest was interfered with in a 
meaningful way.‖  Karo, 468 U.S. at 712; see also id. (―A 
‗seizure‘ of property occurs when ‗there is some meaningful 
interference with an individual‘s possessory interests in that 
property.‘‖ (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 
113 (1984)).  Later cases did not disturb this holding, see, 
e.g., United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 
2007), and Appellees here do not allege the GPS installation 
or subsequent surveillance was a seizure. 
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Supreme Court had made perfectly clear that persons did not 
enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of 
their automobiles.  New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 
(1986); see also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974).  
Similarly axiomatic were the principles that a simple 
―trespass‖ or ―physical intrusion‖ alone, absent an 
infringement upon a reasonable expectation of privacy, was 
not a ―search,‖ see supra Note 11; that information willingly 
conveyed to third parties, such as when a car ―travels public 
thoroughfares where its occupants and its contents are in plain 
view,‖ Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590, retains no reasonable 
expectation of privacy, see supra Note 9; and that objects 
willingly placed or left in the ―open fields,‖ regardless of 
whether those fields are trespassed upon, see Oliver, 466 U.S. 
at 177–80, do not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
see supra Note 10. 
 
2. 
  
After Knotts and Karo, what resulted was a uniform 
consensus across the federal courts of appeals to address the 
issue that the installation and subsequent use of GPS or GPS-
like device was not a search or, at most, was a search but did 
not require a warrant.  See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 
605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2010) (reasoning that 
installation and use of GPS requires only reasonable 
suspicion, since monitoring on public roads is not a search); 
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215–16 
(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that GPS installation and use was not 
a search); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997–98 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 
1126–27 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); see also United States v. 
Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 256–58 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) 
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(holding that installation and use of beeper requires only 
reasonable suspicion, since monitoring on public roads is not 
a search).
13
   
 
Most federal district courts, including the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, had reached the same result.  United 
States v. Jesus-Nunez, No. 1:10-cr-00017-01, 2010 WL 
2991229, **3–5 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2010) (―Since there was 
no Fourth Amendment search or seizure by the Government‘s 
use of the GPS device, the court finds that the agents did not 
need probable cause or even reasonable suspicion to attach 
and monitor the [GPS] device to Defendant‘s cars.‖); e.g., 
United States v. Burton, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1307–08 
(N.D. Fla. 2010); United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 
425, 467–68 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 
The only case to break from this consensus was United 
States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  In 
Maynard, the D.C. Circuit held that prolonged use of a GPS 
device to monitor the movements of defendant Jones‘s 
vehicle ―24 hours a day for four weeks,‖ was a ―search‖ 
under the Fourth Amendment.  615 F.3d at 555.  According to 
the D.C. Circuit, Knotts was not controlling of the question, 
as the court reasoned that Knotts‘s holding endorsed only that 
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 Michael was also the law in the Eleventh Circuit.  
See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th 
Cir. 1981) (en banc) (decisions of the Fifth Circuit prior to 
October 1, 1981 are binding on the Eleventh Circuit); United 
States v. Smith, 387 F. App‘x 918, 920–21 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(unpublished) (citing United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 
(5th Cir. 1981) to support the proposition that GPS 
installation was not a search).   
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―‗[a] person traveling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another,‘ not that such a person 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements 
whatsoever, world without end.‖  Id. at 557 (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281).  
The court reasoned that the Supreme Court in Knotts, and the 
later cases across the courts of appeals, all ―reserved‖ the 
issue of ―whether ‗wholesale‘ or ‗mass‘ electronic 
surveillance of many individuals requires a warrant.‖  Id. at 
558.
14
   
 
As a result, the court concluded that although it may be 
―one thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow 
someone during a single journey as he goes to the market or 
returns home from work,‖ it is a whole other thing ―for that 
stranger to pick up the scent again the next day and the day 
after that, week in and week out, dogging his prey until he has 
identified all the places, people, amusements, and chores that 
make up that person‘s hitherto private routine.‖  Id. at 560.  
The court‘s analysis in Maynard, therefore, was focused not 
on the installation of the device but rather the prolonged use 
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 The Supreme Court in Knotts, in response to the 
argument that its holding would allow ―twenty-four hour 
surveillance of any citizen of this country . . . without judicial 
knowledge or supervision,‖ opined that ―the ‗reality hardly 
suggests abuse,‘‖ and suggested that ―if such dragnet-type 
law enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur, there 
will be time enough then to determine whether different 
constitutional principles may be applicable.‖  Knotts, 460 
U.S. at 283–84 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 
547, 566 (1978)). 
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of the GPS and the quality and quantity of information 
obtained over an extended period of time.  Id. at 562 
(―Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not 
revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person 
does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does 
ensemble.  These types of information can each reveal more 
about a person than does any individual trip viewed in 
isolation.‖).15 
 
Other than Maynard, only a handful of dissenting 
opinions questioned Knotts‘s and Karo‘s holdings or their 
applicability to GPS installation and subsequent surveillance.  
See Karo, 468 U.S. at 736 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―The 
impact of beeper surveillance upon interests protected by the 
Fourth Amendment leads me to what I regard as the perfectly 
sensible conclusion that absent exigent circumstances 
Government agents have a constitutional duty to obtain a 
warrant before they install an electronic device on a private 
citizen‘s property.‖); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 
F.3d 1120, 1124–26 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that 
                                              
 
15
 I pause here to note that the majority characterizes 
Maynard as having held that the mere act of attaching a GPS 
device onto a person‘s vehicle for the purpose of conducting 
continual surveillance, alone, constituted a search.  See Maj. 
Op. at 16; see also id. at 27 n.9 (describing that Maynard 
―explained that warrantless installation of a GPS device by 
the police was per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment‖).  Such a characterization is unfaithful to the 
panel‘s opinion, which explicitly tailored its holdings to the 
fact that the surveillance conducted in that case lasted for a 
month.  See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558, 560. 
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GPS surveillance is a search because GPS devices ―have little 
in common with the primitive devices in Knotts,‖ and provide 
officers ―the power to track the movements of every one of 
us, every day of our lives‖); Michael, 645 F.2d at 260–70 
(Tate, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority that ―an 
individual living under our Constitution has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy such as would protect him from a 
trespass upon his property by governmental agents, a trespass 
that enables them to maintain continuous electronic 
surveillance over his movements twenty-four hours per day 
continuously and indefinitely‖). 
 
3. 
  
I also find several other considerations relevant.  First, 
and most important, is Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which governs the issuance of warrants 
in all federal criminal proceedings.  The 2006 Advisory 
Committee‘s Note explains that Rule 41(b) was amended, in 
part, to ―address the use of tracking devices.‖  Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 41(b) advisory comm. note (2006).  In describing the ideal 
procedure, the Note states that ―[w]arrants may be required to 
monitor tracking devices when they are used to monitor 
persons or property in areas where there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.‖  Id. (citing Karo, 468 U.S. 705).  
Elaborating, the note instructs that ―if the officers intend to 
install or use the device in a constitutionally protected area, 
they must obtain judicial approval to do so.‖  Id.  But, ―[i]f, 
on the other hand, the officers intend to install and use the 
device without implicating any Fourth Amendment rights, 
there is no need to obtain the warrant.‖  Id.  (citing Knotts, 
460 U.S. 276). 
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Moreover, the law enforcement officers consulted with 
an Assistant United States Attorney before conducting the 
installation of the GPS unit and the subsequent surveillance.  
(See Appellant Br. at 56.)  I agree with the majority that ―a 
government attorney‘s approval, standing alone, cannot and 
should not suffice to demonstrate good faith.‖  Maj. Op. at 52 
n.23.  But, as Appellees‘ attorney conceded at oral argument, 
it is certainly another consideration to take into account in the 
good-faith analysis.  (See Oral Arg. Trans. at 52: 4–6 
(conceding that the officers‘ reliance on the opinion of an 
Assistant United States Attorney was ―a factor to look at‖ in 
determining whether the officers acted in good faith).)  See 
also Tracey, 597 F.3d at 153 (concluding that approval from a 
government attorney, inter alia, was one consideration 
evidencing that ―[a] reasonable officer would . . . have 
confidence in the validity of the [search]‖); United States v. 
Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1134 (10th Cir. 2009) (same);  United 
States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 837 (2d Cir. 1985) (same). 
 
IV. 
  
In my view, in light of the legal landscape discussed 
above, when the officers installed the GPS device
16
 upon the 
undercarriage of Harry Katzin‘s vehicle, and then used that 
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 By ―installed the GPS device,‖ of course, I mean 
that the officers magnetically attached the ―slap on‖ GPS 
device upon the undercarriage of Harry Katzin‘s vehicle.  
That device was totally independent of the car, operating 
under its own power.  Also, it was not physically installed 
onto the car using screws, adhesives, or otherwise.  Its 
attachment was occasioned only magnetically.  Thus, for the 
purpose of my analysis, I focus on those facts. 
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device to monitor the vehicle‘s movements for two days 
while it traversed public thoroughfares, those officers were 
acting with ―an objectively ‗reasonable good-faith belief‘ that 
their conduct [was] lawful.‖ Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 
(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 909).  I find that the officers‘ 
actions in this case do not ―exhibit ‗deliberate,‘ ‗reckless,‘ or 
‗grossly negligent‘ disregard for Fourth Amendment rights,‖ 
id. (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144), and, thus, ―the 
deterrent value‖ of excluding the evidence found pursuant to 
the officers‘ conduct would not ―outweigh the resulting 
costs.‖  Id.  Simply put, in this case, ―exclusion cannot not 
‗pay its way.‘‖  Id. at 2428 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 
n.6).  
 
A.   
  
The officers here were acting with an objectively 
reasonable good-faith belief that their warrantless installation 
of the GPS device upon the undercarriage of Harry Katzin‘s 
automobile did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.   
 
Based on fundamental Fourth Amendment principles 
which would have been familiar to any reasonably well 
trained law enforcement officer, there was no possibility that 
the officers, at the time they installed the GPS upon Harry 
Katzin‘s vehicle, would have ―had knowledge‖—nor could 
we now ―charge[] [them] with knowledge‖—―that the search 
was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.‖  Krull, 
480 U.S. at 348–49 (quoting Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542). 
 
Before Jones, the touchstone of any Fourth 
Amendment analysis was whether the Government had 
invaded upon a person‘s reasonable expectation of privacy.  
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See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also 
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000); California 
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).  ―[A]n actual trespass 
[was] neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a 
constitutional violation.‖  Karo, 468 U.S. at 713 (emphasis 
added); see also supra note 11.  As a result, a reasonably well 
trained law enforcement officer would have known that the 
installation of the GPS unit upon the undercarriage of Harry 
Katzin‘s vehicle was a Fourth Amendment ―search‖ only in 
the event that it was apparent that Harry Katzin had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that area. 
 
Of course, Harry Katzin had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy with respect to the interior of his vehicle; even if 
that privacy interest was diminished.  See Cardwell, 417 U.S. 
at 589–90.  But it would have been objectively reasonable for 
a law enforcement officer to conclude that he lacked a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior—
specifically, the undercarriage—of the vehicle.   
 
In Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) and again 
in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986), the Supreme 
Court made it quite clear that persons lack a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the exterior of their automobiles.  
See Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 591 –92 (―With the search limited 
to the examination of the tire on the wheel and the taking of 
paint scrapings from the exterior of the vehicle left in the 
public parking lot, we fail to comprehend what expectation of 
privacy was infringed.‖); Class, 475 U.S. at 114 (plurality 
opinion) (―The exterior of a car, of course, is thrust into the 
public eye, and thus to examine it does not constitute a 
‗search.‘‖ (citing Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 588–89)).  In light of 
this long-standing Supreme Court precedent, the officers 
36 
 
would have had an ―objectively reasonable good-faith belief‖ 
that Harry Katzin lacked a reasonable expectation in the 
exterior of his vehicle, and thus that ―their conduct was 
lawful‖ when they installed the GPS on the car‘s 
undercarriage.  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (internal quotation 
mark omitted).
17
 
 
Again, I make no claim that Class or Cardwell qualify 
as ―binding appellate precedent‖ under Davis.  That does not 
end the inquiry, however.  Instead, what resolves the inquiry 
is that, in light of the pre-Jones legal landscape, the law 
enforcement officers here could have reasonably concluded 
that Supreme Court precedent authorized, or at the very least 
affirmed the constitutionality of, their conduct.  Regardless of 
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 The majority is correct to point out, in its brief 
discussion of Class‘s applicability to our warrant analysis, 
that Jones dismissed Class‘s relevancy with regard to whether 
a search occurs where officers install and subsequently track a 
GPS device upon an automobile.  See Maj. Op. at 34 n.14.  
That does not mean, however, that Class and Cardwell are 
similarly irrelevant to our good-faith analysis.  At the time the 
officers were acting, those two cases were generally 
understood to stand for the proposition that one lacks a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of his 
automobile.   See, e.g., Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1215 
(―[T]he undercarriage of a vehicle, as part of its exterior, is 
not entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy.‖); United 
States v. George, 971 F.2d 1113, 1119–20 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(―There is thus little question in the aftermath of Cardwell 
and Class that one does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the visible exterior parts of an automobile that 
travels the public roads and highways.‖). 
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the alternate facts in Class and Cardwell, those cases‘ 
holdings and principles of law, which would have been 
known by a reasonably well trained law enforcement officer, 
made it clear that before Jones a person lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the exterior of his automobile, and, 
thus, a simple trespass thereupon by law enforcement officers 
would not have constituted a ―search.‖  As a result, I cannot 
conclude that the law enforcement officers‘ conduct in 
installing the GPS device to the undercarriage of Harry 
Kaztin‘s vehicle was a ―‗deliberate,‘ ‗reckless,‘ or ‗grossly 
negligent‘ disregard of Fourth Amendment rights.‖  Davis, 
131 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144). 
 
B. 
  
Similarly, the officers here were acting with an 
objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their warrantless 
use of the GPS to monitor Harry Katzin‘s vehicle while it 
traversed public roads over the course of two days was 
constitutionally permissible. 
  
First, the majority distinguishes, and thus dismisses, 
Knotts and Karo on their facts.  Paramount, the majority says, 
are that facts that ―[n]either case involved a physical trespass 
onto the target vehicle; in both cases the police placed the 
beeper inside of a container which was then loaded into the 
target vehicle by the driver . . . . [and] both Karo and Knotts 
addressed the use of beepers, which . . . are markedly 
different from GPS trackers.‖  Maj. Op. at 40.  True, these 
factual distinctions would matter much if the Government 
were arguing that Knotts and Karo qualified as ―binding 
appellate precedent‖ under Davis.  But, as discussed above, 
that is not the Government‘s argument.   A reasonably well 
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trained police officer, acting in December 2010, would have 
thought Knotts and Karo to have meant exactly what they 
said with regard to GPS and GPS-like surveillance.  Those 
cases made absolutely clear that ―[a] person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another,‖  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281, because the ―movements 
of the automobile‖ while on public roads ―could have been 
observed by the naked eye.‖  See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713–14. 
Thus, the Fourth Amendment simply was not implicated.  See 
id.; see also Sparks, 711 F.3d at 65 (―After Knotts . . . [it was] 
settled . . . [that] using a beeper to monitor a person‘s 
movements in a car on public roads did not implicate the 
Fourth Amendment, because there was no privacy interest to 
be infringed.‖).  At the time the officers were acting, Knotts‘s 
holding was familiar and sacrosanct.  See, e.g., Marquez, 605 
F.3d at 609; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996; McIver, 186 F.3d at 
1126.   
 
This may well be enough to justify the officers‘ good 
faith in performing warrantless GPS surveillance of Harry 
Katzin‘s automobile.  See Sparks, 711 F.3d at 66–67 
(concluding good-faith exception applied to GPS surveillance 
because Knotts ―clearly authorized the agents to use a GPS-
based tracking device‖).  But I need not answer that question, 
because ―good faith‖ is determined in light of ―all of the 
circumstances.‖  Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23; see also 
Herring, 555 U.S. at 145.  In this case, in addition to Knotts 
and Karo, the officers were also guided, and reasonably 
relied, upon a ―uniform treatment‖ of ―continuous judicial 
approval‖ across the federal courts with regard to the 
constitutionality of warrantless GPS use.  See Peltier, 422 
U.S. at 541–42; see also Caleb Mason, New Police 
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Surveillance Technologies and the Good-Faith Exception: 
Warrantless GPS Tracker Evidence After United States v. 
Jones, 13 NEV. L. J. 60, 65 (2012) (before Jones, ―everyone 
thought‖ that the ―key fact‖ from Knotts and Karo ―was that 
the cars were being monitored while they were on public 
roads, where anyone could see them‖).  Specifically, nearly 
every federal court to consider the issue had concluded that a 
warrant was unnecessary to conduct GPS surveillance, the 
sole exception being Maynard.
18
  
 
Consequently, in light of Knotts and Karo, and their 
subsequent treatment, it was ―objectively reasonable‖ for the 
law enforcement officers to have believed that the use of the 
GPS device to conduct surveillance upon Harry Katzin‘s 
vehicle while it moved along public roadways was not a 
Fourth Amendment ―search.‖  See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282–83 
(explaining that where one ―travel[s] over the public streets 
he voluntarily convey[s] to anyone who want[s] to look the 
fact that he [is] traveling over particular roads in a particular 
direction, the fact of whatever stops he ma[kes], and the fact 
of his final destination‖); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 224 (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (―Comings and goings on public streets are public 
matters, and the Constitution does not disable police from 
observing what every member of the public can see.‖); id. at 
215 (majority opinion) (―The Fourth Amendment simply does 
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 The majority claims that, under the logic of my 
analysis, Maynard should have put the law enforcement 
officers ―on notice that [GPS] devices could implicate Fourth 
Amendment rights.‖  Maj. Op. at 54 n.24 (alteration, 
omission, and internal quotation marks omitted). For the 
reasons set forth at infra Part V, I disagree. 
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not require the police traveling in the public . . . to obtain a 
warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.‖).   
 
C. 
 
Moreover, two additional considerations bolster my 
conclusion that the law enforcement officers here acted with 
―an objectively ‗reasonable good-faith belief‘ that their 
conduct was lawful.‖ Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Leon, 
468 U.S. at 909). 
  
First is the fact that the warrantless installation of the 
GPS device and its subsequent surveillance complied with the 
commentary to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which states that ―[i]f . . . the officers intend to 
install and use [a GPS] device without implicating any Fourth 
Amendment rights, there is no need to obtain [a] warrant.‖  
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) advisory comm. note (2006).  As 
discussed, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to 
have concluded that Harry Katzin lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the undercarriage of his automobile, 
and the GPS device was never used to conduct surveillance in 
any area but the public roadways upon which the car was 
traveling.  Thus, a reasonable reading of this commentary 
would have led to the equally reasonable conclusion that the 
officers here did not require a warrant to act.
19
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 Although the Government neglected to argue this 
fact, similar arguments have been made in similar cases, 
including cases heard by District Courts in this Circuit.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Lopez, __ F. Supp. 2d __, C.A. No. 10-
cr-67(GMS), 2013 WL 3212347, at *3 (D. Del. June 26, 
2013); United States v. Willford, __ F. Supp. 2d __, Crim. No. 
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 Second, the law enforcement officers consulted with 
an Assistant United States Attorney before conducting the 
installation of the GPS unit and the subsequent surveillance.  
(See Appellant Br. at 56.)  More than likely, that attorney‘s 
discussion with the officers about the constitutionality of their 
conduct proceeded along similar lines as my analysis above.  
But, important for our purposes, the fact that the officers 
consulted with a government attorney before acting, who then 
approved their desired course of action, although certainly not 
dispositive on its own, is a consideration weighing in favor of 
the conclusion that ―[a] reasonable officer would . . . have 
confidence in the validity of the [search].‖  Tracey, 597 F.3d 
at 153; see also Otero, 563 F.3d at 1134; Fama, 758 F.2d at 
837. 
  
Thus, taking into consideration the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, the near unanimous treatment by the federal 
                                                                                                     
ELH-11-0258, 2013 WL 2552446, at *20 (D. Md. June 7, 
2013).  Furthermore, the majority claims this commentary is a 
codification of ―nothing more than the unremarkable 
proposition that the police need not obtain a warrant if their 
action does not violate the Fourth Amendment.‖  Since 
Maynard put law enforcement ―on notice‖ that GPS use could 
affect Fourth Amendment rights, the majority reasons, the 
Rule has no substantive effect on the good-faith analysis.  
Maj. Op. at 54 n.24.  Again, as I discuss at infra Part V, I do 
not read Maynard to have such an effect, and, thus, I am at a 
loss to see how a reasonably well trained law enforcement 
officer, acting at the time the officers did in this case, could 
have known that their actions ―implicat[ed] . . . the Fourth 
Amendment.‖ 
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courts to have addressed the issue, the commentary to Rule 
41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the fact 
the officers here consulted with an Assistant United States 
Attorney, it is clear that the officers were not acting with 
―‗deliberate,‘ ‗reckless,‘ or ‗grossly negligent‘ disregard of 
Fourth Amendment rights,‖ Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 
(quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144), when they conducted the 
warrantless installation and subsequent surveillance of the 
GPS device upon Harry Katzin‘s automobile, but were 
instead acting with ―an objectively ‗reasonable good-faith 
belief‘ that their conduct [was] lawful.‖  Id. (quoting Leon, 
468 U.S. at 909).   
 
V. 
  
The majority holds otherwise, because, in its view, the 
difference between the beepers used in Knotts and Karo and 
the GPS device used in this case is ―one of kind, not degree,‖ 
Maj. Op. at 47 n.20, which makes all the ―differen[ce].‖  
Furthermore, the majority chides reliance on Knotts, Karo, 
and the relevant cases from our sister circuits because United 
States v. Maynard, which held that prolonged GPS 
surveillance was a search and did require a warrant, put the 
officers on notice ―that such devices could ‗implicat[e] . . . 
Fourth Amendment rights.‘‖  Maj. Op. at 54 n.24.  I disagree 
that these two considerations render the officers‘ conduct here 
objectively unreasonable and sufficiently culpable so as to 
incur the wrath of the exclusionary rule.   
  
Certainly, the technological difference between the 
beepers of the 1980s and modern GPS devices is a 
consideration to take into account in determining whether the 
law enforcement officers were acting with an objectively 
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reasonable belief their actions were lawful.  Modern ―GPS 
units do not require police to follow the suspect visually, do 
not allow the driver to detect tailing, and do not require an 
expensive deployment of equipment and manpower.‖  United 
States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 2011); see 
also Maynard, 615 F.3d at 565 (opining that ―practical 
considerations prevent visual surveillance from lasing [as] 
long‖ as ―the use of the GPS in [that] case‖); Pineda-Moreno, 
617 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (―[T]here‘s no hiding from the all-seeing 
network of GPS satellites that hover overhead, which never 
sleep, never blink, never get confused and never lose 
attention.‖).   
  
Admittedly, this makes GPS devices different from the 
beepers used in Knotts and Karo.  Beepers do not 
independently determine their geographic location, but, 
instead, ―emit[] periodic signals that can be picked up by a 
radio receiver‖ within range of the beeper‘s radio transmitter.  
See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.  Beepers thus aid law 
enforcement by assisting officers in visual surveillance of a 
suspect, rather than doing the work of the officer altogether.  
See Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1124 (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (―[M]odern 
[GPS] devices . . . can record the car‘s movements without 
human intervention—quietly, invisibly, with uncanny 
precision.‖). 
  
Notwithstanding these technological differences, ―[i]t 
is the exploitation of technological advances that implicates 
the Fourth Amendment, not their mere existence.‖  Karo, 468 
U.S. at 712.  ―Certainly, a GPS tracker is more capable than a 
beeper, ‗but nothing inheres in the technology to take it out of 
44 
 
Knotts‘s holding.‘‖  Sparks, 711 F.3d at 66 (footnote omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 278 
(7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum J., concurring)); see also United States 
v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 835 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that 
―any possible technological differences between a 1981 
‗beeper‘ and the GPS device‖ insufficient because the two 
devices‘ ―functionality [were] sufficiently similar‖); United 
States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, 
C.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (―There 
is no material difference between tracking the movements of 
the Knotts defendant with a beeper and tracking the Jones 
appellant with a GPS.‖). 
  
Regardless of the technological differences, the GPS 
reported to law enforcement no more information than that 
which the officers could have obtained through pure visual 
surveillance.  Jesus-Nunez, No. 1:10-cr-00017-01, 2010 WL 
2991229, at *3; see also Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d at 275 
(dismissing as immaterial the increased accuracy of GPS 
devices since ―real-time information is exactly the kind of 
information that drivers make available by traversing public 
roads‖).  Every piece of data the GPS unit provided law 
enforcement officers could have been otherwise obtained by a 
police officer tracking Harry Katzin‘s vehicle on foot or in his 
squad car on a public street;
20
 by an officer keeping an eye on 
                                              
20
 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 
(1988) (―[T]he police cannot reasonably be expected to avert 
their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have 
been observed by any member of the public.‖); Texas v. 
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (plurality opinion) (―The 
general public could peer into the interior of Brown‘s 
automobile from any number of angles; there is no reason 
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the vehicle through use of a telescope or binoculars, or 
utilizing a flashlight or spotlight so as to not lose the car 
under the shadow of the night;
21
 or by an officer utilizing an 
airplane or a helicopter to follow the vehicle along the public 
roadways.
22
   
                                                                                                     
[the officer] should be precluded from observing as an officer 
what would be entirely visible to him as a private citizen.‖); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (―What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection.‖). 
 
21
 See Brown, 460 U.S. at 739–40 (plurality opinion) 
(―It is . . . beyond dispute that [the officer‘s] action in shining 
his flashlight to illuminate the interior of Brown‘s car 
trenched upon no right secured to the latter by the Fourth 
Amendment.‖); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 
(1927) (―For aught that appears, the cases of liquor were on 
deck and, like the defendants, were discovered before the 
motorboat was boarded.  Such use of a searchlight is 
comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass.  It is 
not prohibited by the Constitution.‖). 
 
22
 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448–449, 451–52 
(1989) (an officer ―circl[ing] twice over respondent's property 
in a helicopter at the height of 400 feet‖ was not a search 
because ―the police may see what may be seen from a public 
vantage point where they have a right to be‖ (alteration and 
internal quotation marks omitted)); California v. Ciraolo, 476 
U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986) (―Any member of the public flying 
in this airspace who glanced down could have seen 
everything that these officers observed.‖).   
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The efficiency or efficacy of an officer‘s natural senses 
often benefit from advances in technology.  See Dow Chem. 
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 231 (1986) (changes in 
technology not only ―enhance[] industrial process, and indeed 
all areas of life,‖ but ―they have also enhanced law 
enforcement techniques‖).  But ―[t]he mere fact that human 
vision is enhanced‖ by some form of technological advance, 
by itself, ―does not give rise to constitutional problems.‖  Id. 
at 238; see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 513 
(1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) (―[N]either should the 
command of the Fourth Amendment be limited by nice 
distinctions turning on the kind of electronic equipment 
employed.‖).  Again, ―[i]t is the exploitation of technological 
advances that implicates the Fourth Amendment, not their 
mere existence.‖  Karo, 468 U.S. at 712.  ―Nothing in the 
Fourth Amendment prohibit[s] the police from augmenting 
the sensory facilities bestowed upon them at birth with such 
enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this 
case.‖  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.  The information obtained 
through use of the GPS was information otherwise observable 
by the naked eye.  See id. at 281–82.  The GPS unit simply 
made it easier for the law enforcement officers to obtain.  See 
id. at 284 (―Insofar as respondent‘s complaint appears to be 
simply that scientific devices such as beepers enabled police 
to be more effective in detecting crime, it simply has no 
constitutional foundation.‖).  And at the time the officers here 
acted, it was indubitable that Harry Katzin lacked any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information the GPS 
unit was procuring.  See id at 281.
23
  Thus, even taking into 
                                              
23
 Today, the question remains open as to whether 
Jones effectually abrogated Knotts‘s conclusion that persons 
lack any reasonable expectation of privacy in the information 
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consideration the technological difference between the 
beepers used in Knotts and Karo and the GPS units used in 
this case, the officers were clearly not ―exploit[ing]‖ GPS 
technology in a way so as to put them on notice that their 
                                                                                                     
the GPS unit was procuring.  The only question answered in 
Jones was whether a search had occurred through the 
installation and subsequent use of the GPS device.  Thus, the 
Fourth Amendment implications of the information obtained 
by the GPS surveillance, alone, were not discussed.  Jones did 
state that ―Knotts noted the ‗limited use which the 
government made of the signals from [that] particular beeper; 
and reserved the question whether ‗different constitutional 
principles may be applicable‘ to ‗dragnet-type law 
enforcement practices‘ of the type that GPS tracking made 
possible [in that case].‖  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 n.6 (citations 
omitted).  But Justice Scalia‘s opinion for the majority 
refrained from altering Knotts‘s conclusion that ―the 
information obtained—the location of the automobile 
carrying the [beeper] on public roads . . .—had been 
voluntarily conveyed to the public,‖ and was therefore not a 
search.  Id. at 951–52.  Nonetheless, five justices wrote or 
joined the concurring opinions in Jones, all of which seemed 
to endorse the so-called ―mosaic‖ theory expressed in 
Maynard—which would unequivocally limit the holding in 
Knotts to apply in only short-term surveillance.  See Orin 
Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 311, 326 (2012).  This question does not need 
to be answered today; but emphasizes the major shift caused 
by Jones in Fourth Amendment law, and the vastly different 
legal regime under which the law enforcement officers here 
were acting. 
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actions were unconstitutional.
24
  See Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 
at 279–80 (Flaum, J., concurring) (opining before Jones that 
―[t]he holding of Knotts is that a person has no expectation of 
privacy in movements from one place to another on public 
                                              
24
 The majority concludes otherwise, alluding that my 
preferred disposition would ―leave [persons] at the mercy of 
advancing technology.‖  Maj. Op. at 48 n.20 (citing Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2001)).  This case is 
categorically distinct from Kyllo.  In Kyllo, the officers 
utilized technology to observe infrared radiation, which is 
otherwise invisible to the naked eye.  533 U.S. at 29.  
Furthermore, the officers utilized that technology in order to 
determine the relative temperature of the interior of a home, 
an area entitled to almost absolute protection under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 29–30; see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 
U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (―[W]hen it comes to 
the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals.‖).  In 
contrast, the use of the GPS device in this case provided 
information otherwise observable by the naked eye on a 
public street.  What is more, although the Court found it 
―foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to 
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely 
unaffected by the advance of technology,‖ Kyllo made much 
of the fact that the technology used in that case was ―not in 
general public use.‖  533 U.S. at 33–34.  Alternatively, GPS 
technology is widespread, and one need look only on the 
dashboard of his vehicle or the screen of his cellular 
telephone to spot one.  Kyllo‘s concerns, of course, arise in all 
Fourth Amendment cases dealing with advanced technology.  
But it is safe to say that those concerns are not implicated by 
out facts. 
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roads; by its terms, the holding is indifferent to the 
technology used to observe those movements‖). 
  
Nor does the existence of United States v. Maynard, 
615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) affect the officers‘ reasonable 
belief that their conduct was lawful.  First, the Maynard 
holding was based on the fact that the GPS surveillance 
conducted in that case lasted for four weeks, which allowed 
law enforcement to obtain ―information not revealed by short-
term surveillance.‖  See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562; Cuevas-
Perez, 640 F.3d at 274 (―[T]he Maynard court repeatedly 
distinguished the surveillance at issue there from surveillance 
during a single journey.‖).  Conversely, the GPS tracking in 
this case lasted for only two days, (see Appendix at 112–15, 
143–50.), and Appellees make no argument that the 
information obtained by the GPS device ―reveal[ed] more‖ 
about their personal lives ―than does any individual trip 
viewed in isolation.‖  Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.25  Besides, 
                                              
25
 The majority claims this is a distinction without a 
point, because ―when the police attached their GPS device to 
Harry Katzin‘s van, they had no way of knowing when the 
next Rite Aid robbery would take place‖; thus characterizing 
the GPS tracking here as ―a long-term surveillance project.‖  
See Maj. Op. at 50 & n.22.  But for purposes of whether a 
Fourth Amendment violation occurred it matters not what law 
enforcement officers could have done but what they did do.  
See Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 238 n.5 (―Fourth 
Amendment cases must be decided on the facts of each case, 
not by extravagant generalizations. ‗[W]e have never held 
that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy 
constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.‘‖ 
(alteration in original) (quoting Karo, 468 U.S. at 712)); cf. 
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―Knotts gave scant reason to think that the duration of the 
tracking in that case was material to the Court‘s reasoning.‖  
Sparks, 711 F.3d at 67.
26
 
                                                                                                     
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984) (―The 
concept of an interest in privacy that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically 
different from the mere expectation, however well justified, 
that certain facts will not come to the attention of the 
authorities.‖). 
 
26
 The Knotts Court did say, however, that ―if dragnet-
type law enforcement practices‖ such as ―twenty-four hour 
surveillance of any citizen of this country . . . without judicial 
knowledge or supervision,‖ ―should eventually occur, there 
will be time enough then to determine whether different 
constitutional principles may be applicable.‖  Knotts, 460 
U.S. at 283–84.  But merely acknowledging that ―different 
constitutional principles may be applicable‖ does not imply 
what those principles may be and how they impact the 
relevant analysis. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. __, 
133 S. Ct. 2612, 2637 n.3 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(―Acknowledging the existence of ‗serious constitutional 
questions‘ does not suggest how those questions should be 
answered.‖ (citation omitted)).  Nonetheless, I seriously doubt 
that the ―dragnet-type law enforcement practices‖ referred to 
by the Knotts Court, whatever they may be, are akin to what 
occurred in this case, where law enforcement officers had 
evidence to suggest that Harry Katzin was a serious criminal; 
evidence his attorney admitted at argument gave rise to 
probable cause.  (See Oral Arg. Trans. at 43:7–16.)  
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Furthermore, consider this hypothetical: Imagine, under facts 
identical to our case, the D.C. Circuit‘s Maynard decision 
was, instead, the only case holding that GPS use was not a 
search and did not require a warrant.  If, under those 
circumstances, the officers claimed to rely only upon 
Maynard for a reasonable belief that their conduct complied 
with the Constitution, that consideration would weigh more 
toward a finding of law enforcement culpability.  But, here, 
we are presented with the alternative, and Maynard was the 
only holding (i.e., not a dissent or concurring opinion) from 
any court at the time the officers executed the warrantless 
GPS surveillance that considered their conduct illegal.  As a 
result, the fact that Appellees are pointing to Maynard as the 
only case that said the law enforcement officers could not do 
what they did is a consideration that weighs in the officers‘ 
favor. 
 
**** 
  
Under the majority‘s rule, where law enforcement 
officers engage in ―extrapolat[ion] [of] their own 
constitutional rule,‖ or where officers ―assum[e] that their 
own self-derived rule sanction[s] their conduct,‖ those 
officers act with sufficient culpablity so as to justify 
application of the exclusionary rule.  Maj. Op. at 51.  I agree 
that ―[t]he justifications for the good-faith exception [may] 
not extend to situations in which police officers have 
interpreted ambiguous precedent.‖  Sparks, 711 F.3d at 67 
(quoting Davis, 598 F.3d at 1267).  But that is not the case 
here, ―where new developments in the law have upended the 
settled rules on which police relied.‖  Id. at 68. 
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Before Jones, all but one federal court of appeals to 
address the issue unequivocally concluded that Knotts, Karo, 
and other relevant Supreme Court precedent sanctioned the 
law enforcement conduct that occurred here.  These Fourth 
Amendment principles, upon which the law enforcement 
officers relied in this case, were settled maxims of 
constitutional jurisprudence, some of them governing law 
enforcement conduct for decades.  The majority, viewing this 
case through Jones-colored lenses, rules with the benefit of a 
hindsight that was unavailable to the officers here.   
  
United States v. Jones changed things; and changed 
them in a way very few—if any at all—predicted.  The 
exclusionary rule does not require us to punish the law 
enforcement officers here for failing to predict that sea 
change.
27
  The District Court below put it quite aptly: 
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 I have serious reservations about the implications of 
the majority‘s ruling in this case.  Nevertheless, I admit my 
position might encourage some law enforcement officers to 
bend and twist existing precedent and legal principles to their 
breaking points.  In some cases, law enforcement ―reliance‖ 
could be marginal at best. 
 
 But I have confidence that courts are aptly suited to 
discern the true ―good-faith actors‖ from the bad; and that, in 
circumstances such as those presented in this case, we will be 
able to definitively answer the question of whether law 
enforcement officers were acting with objectively reasonable 
good faith.  Rulings that officers come up short will help 
deter undesirable law enforcement conduct. 
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[T]he Court hastens to emphasize that it has no 
concern that the prosecutorial and law 
enforcement personnel here were undertaking 
their work in this investigation and prosecution 
in a calculated or otherwise deliberately cavalier 
                                                                                                     
 The majority recognizes that ―applying existing 
precedential framework to subtle factual permutations is 
something that police officers—and other law enforcement 
personnel—do all the time.‖  Maj. Op. at 57 n.27.  But while 
insisting that its opinion does not ―curtail such practices,‖ the 
majority punishes the law enforcement officers in this case 
for performing that exact practice.  There may not have been 
a case from our Circuit or the Supreme Court specifically 
detailing what the officers should have done in the particular 
circumstances presented here.  But there were cases from the 
Supreme Court that came very close; close enough, in fact, 
that some of our sister courts found them to be controlling as 
precedents in situations similar to the case at bar.   
  
 Obviously there is not enough time, history, or reporter 
space to answer every single Fourth Amendment question.  
As a result, the exclusionary rule has developed to provide a 
remedy on the backend.  Often the hurried judgments of an 
officer, however well intentioned, simply do not comply with 
constitutional rights.  But as a matter of Fourth Amendment 
policy, I would rather allow the officer more freedom in 
performing his job—particularly where the answer to the 
―appl[ication of] existing precedential framework to subtle 
factual permutations‖ is so readily apparent as it was in this 
case—than protect courts from overly burdensome 
suppression motions.  Ruling on suppression motions is part 
of our job.   
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or casual manner in the hopes of just meeting 
the outer limits of the constitutional contours of 
the Katzins‘ rights.  Indeed, these actors could 
well profess surprise at the specific outcome of 
Jones. 
 
United States v. Katzin, Crim. No. 11-226, 2012 WL 
1646894, at *10 n.15 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2012).  Regardless of 
this seemingly dispositive conclusion, the District Court 
found, and the majority now affirms, that the exclusionary 
rule requires suppression of the evidence obtained by such 
non-culpable law enforcement conduct. 
  
Doing so renders the exclusionary rule a ―strict-
liability‖ regime, something which it emphatically is not.  See 
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429.  The exclusionary rule is ―a 
‗prudential‘ doctrine,‖ id. at 2426 (quoting Scott, 524 U.S. at 
363), which requires a ―rigorous weighing of [the] costs and 
deterrence benefits,‖ id. at 2427, lest a ―guilty and possibly 
dangerous defendant[] go[es] free,‖ Herring, 555 U.S. at 141.  
As a society, we willingly swallow that ―bitter pill‖ when we 
must.  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427.  But under the circumstances 
present in this case, I do not find the law enforcement conduct 
to be ―sufficiently culpable‖ so that the benefit from deterring 
that conduct ―is worth the price paid by the justice system,‖ 
John, 654 F.3d at 417, even if it might create a marginal 
incentive for officers to ―err on the side of constitutional 
behavior.‖  United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 
(1982).  Marginal deterrence is not the trigger of the 
exclusionary rule, Herring, 555 U.S. at 141; law enforcement 
culpability, and, thus, the opportunity for appreciable 
deterrence is.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 909; John, 654 F.3d at 417.  
In consequence, because I find that the law enforcement 
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officers here lacked the requisite culpability in their actions so 
as to justify application of the exclusionary rule, I respectfully 
dissent from the majority‘s conclusion to the alternative.  I 
would reverse the District Court below. 
